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ABSTRACT

OCCASIONALISM IN THE MALEBRANCHE-ARNAULD DEBATE
SEPTEMBER,

ANDREW

1992

BLACK, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

G.

Ph D
.

.

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

,

Directed by: Professor Robert

C.

Sleigh, Jr.

The philosophical and theological debate between

Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld is one of the most
important philosophical exchanges of the late seventeenth
century.

One of the most siginificant products of this

debate is Mai ebranche

'

s

clarification of his theory of

causality, known as occasionalism.
in this case,
is the

A theory of causality,

is a theory in answer to the question,

what

extent of God's causal agency in the world and what

room does that leave for causality in created substances?

Occasionalism is a version of the view that God
only causal agent.

Arnauld'

s

principal criticisms are

directed against the details of Malebranche
rather than the main thesis.

is the

'

s

account

Contemporaneously with this

debate, Arnauld was carrying on his celebrated

correpondence with Leibniz.

Arnauld claims to Leibniz

that the latter's own theory of causality, the theory of

concomitance,

is

indistiguishable from occasionalism.

By

examining the details of occasionalism, as they are

discussed in the Malebranche - Arnauld debate, it is may be
established to what extent Arnauld 's claim is true.
v
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
A.

In May 1679,

Prefatory Remarks

Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld,

who had been on terms of mutual admiration for many years,

were brought together by friends to discuss the issue of

grace and salvation. Arnauld, a leading spokesman for the

Jansenist movement, was concerned about the effect that

Malebranche was having on many Jansenist priests,
converting them to orthodoxy and,

in some cases,

rendering

them harsh critics of their own former colleagues.

meeting was not a success.

The

Malebranche was unable to

communicate with the overzeal ous Arnauld, and proposed
instead a written discussion.

Mai ebranche

'

s

first

contribution to this correspondence was his Treatise on
Nature and Grace

.

The Treatise is a deep and systematic

account of God's working in the world, including answers
to the problems of the existence of evil, the possibility
of human freedom,

and the seemingly arbitrary distribution

of the grace necessary for salvation.
Mai ebranche

'

s

At the heart of

solutions to these problems is his theory

known as "occasionalism".

What followed was a lengthy

exchange of books and published letters,

little of it in

good humour (for reasons mostly unconnected with the

philosophical issues).

1

The exchange extended to cover a very wide range
of

philosophical issues.

However,

I

am interested only in

the issues connected with occasionalism.
a

Occasionalism is

general theory of causality, that is to say, a theory

about what entities exhibit the property of being a real
causal agent.

Malebranche

'

s

My aim is to establish a working account of

version of occasionalism (Chapter III), to

show how he employed the theory in his answers to the

problems addressed in the Traite

,

and to investigate the

ensuing debate between Malebranche and Arnauld.

This

latter part of the enterprise constitutes the central

chapter of the dissertation (Chapter IV)
critic celebrated for his incisiveness.

.

Arnauld was a
The criticisms

found in his many works opposing Malebranche invariably
cut straight to the root of the latter's theory.

Malebranche, on the other hand, was a slow but methodical

philosopher who did his best work under the constant
probing of his critics.

Malebranche

'

s

On many points,

it seems,

most considered view comes out in response

to some objection of Arnauld' s.

Malebranche and Arnauld constitute two corners of a
fascinating philosphical triangle of which the third
corner is Leibniz.

Arnauld was convinced that Leibniz'

own theory of causality, the "hypothesis of the

concomitance and harmony among creatures" (which we now

know as "the pre-established harmony") reduced to

2

occasional ism, something Leibniz vehemently denied.
denial, coupled with Mai ebranche

'

s

This

claims that Arnauld

misunderstood occasionalism, presents an interesting
question: what is the real relationship between

occasionalism and the theory of pre-established harmony?
If it can be established in what way,

if at all,

was in the wrong about occasionalism,

it should be

Arnauld

possible to interpret the relevant correspondence with
Leibniz in that light.

If,

on the other hand,

the

conclusion must be that Arnauld was right about
Mai ebranche,

then perhaps he is right about the

relationship as well.

This is the work of the last two

Chapters (V and VI).
For Arnauld,

it is not most significantly in the nuts

and bolts of the theories that their similarity lies, but

rather in the
theology.

consequences of each for philosophical

think it is fair to say that Arnauld felt

I

each view had,
(i)

in particular,

two unsavoury consequences:

the view puts an end to freedom, both human and

divine,

so that all the actions of both God and men are

determined;

(ii) as an upshot of

of necessity,

(i),

it becomes a matter

rather than a contingent fact, that the

world is the way it is.
The first two chapters of this work each play an

introductory role.

In Chapter

I,

I

examine the nature and

purpose of a general theory of causality in the

3

s

seventeenth century.

It is my contention that the

theories of both Malebranche and Leibniz were motivated
by
a desire to answer the question, what is
the extent
of

God's providential action in the world and what room
does
that leave for causal efficacy in created beings?

I

also

give some of the historical and theological background to
the debate between Malebranche and Arnauld.
II,

I

in Chapter

examine the Cartesian antecedents of Malebranche

occasionalism.

'

Each of Malebranche and Arnauld regarded

himself as a good Cartesian.

What is there in the

thinking of Descartes and his immediate followers to
support the position of either?

Occasionalism

B.

Occasionalism is a theory of causality.

In the

seventeenth century, this meant not an analysis of the
concept of cause, but rather an explanatory catalogue of
the kinds of entity that exhibit the property of

causality,

indicating,

if necessary,

ordering among such entities.

a heirarchical

It is important to note

also that, for Malebranche at least, occasionalism is a

very general theory of causality.

Significantly it is not

just a theory about mind-body interaction, as has often

been suggested

1
.

Mai ebranche

'

s

motivation for introducing a theory of

causality is not unusual in his milieu.

Like all

theologically motivated philsophers he is confronted with
4

t.he

following problem.

What is the extent of God's

exercise of causality and what room does that leave for
the creaturely exercise of causality?

if God’s causal

agency is ubiquitous, then what sense can be made of the
idea that humans are free agents?
We can identify a whole range of theories in answer
to this problem.

At one end of the spectrum there is a

theory we might describe as naturalism (although it may as
well be called atheism).

This is the view that there is

no exercise of divine causality and that all causal

relations are purely natural, i.e. they involve only the
exercise of creaturely causal powers.

At the other end

there is the position that has been called voluntarism

2
.

This is the view that everything requiring a cause is the

effect only of God's exercise of his causal powers.

Voluntarism has also been used as a name for a
different though related theory, especially in relation to
the philosophy of Descartes.

Descartes has been called a

radical voluntarist, and what this means is that he held

that God created not only all contingently exisiting
substances, but also everything else there is,
eternal truths,

including

such as the laws of logic, propositions of

mathematics and the simple natures of things.

Here,

voluntarism is a theory about which entities require
divine creation rather than which events require divine
causes, but the relationship is evident. One could see how

5

radical voluntarism might be held as an extension
of the

view described above as voluntarism.

A radical

voluntarist would, then, simply differ from a more
conservative voluntarist in respect of the kinds of entity

regarded as requiring causation.
In between naturalism and voluntarism is a

considerable variety of possible views which have in
common the compatibility of divine and natural exercise of
causality.

First of all, there is deism.

This is the

view that God's causal role in the world extends as far as
the Creation.

Thereafter, nature takes over and all the

subsequent effects are the consequences of creaturely
causal actions.
that,

A diluted version of deism would have it

after the Creation, God for the most part leaves the

world to run its own course, although he occasionally
intervenes (e.g. with deluges and plagues of locusts) when
he sees that the natural course of events is getting out
It seems to me that this would be a natural way

of hand.

to read the early books of the Bible, particularly

"Genesis "

.

Between deism and voluntarism lie the varieties of
theism.

A main idea of theism is that God’s causal

involvement in the world is providential.

Minimally, that

means that the theist is committed to God's causal agency
in everything requiring a cause.

The varieties of theism

arise in the various views about the compatibility of
6

.

.

^

God's providence with natural causation.

On some

versions, God contributes part of what is required for

each effect and natural causes provide the rest 4
.

On

other versions, God produces perfection and natural causes
serve to limit that perfection

5
.

An alternative view is

that God is a complete cause of each effect in one way in

which it is possible to be a cause, but there is more than
one concept of cause,

and hence creatures can be causes in

another sense.

Occasionalism is a kind of voluntarism.

It begins

with the idea of Providence, the idea that God's causal

agency is ubiquitous.

Central to Christian theology in

most forms is the idea that God, possessed of perfect

knowledge about the possible courses of creation, preordains the occurence of every event in accordance with
the design that he has for the world.

We can identify,

therefore, three governing principles of God's

providential action:

7

God has perfect
The Principle of Foreknowledge:
every action he
outcomes
of
the
of
all
knowledge
world.
created
performs in the
For every event e
The Principle of Pre-ordination:
has willed that e
God
world,
that occurs in the created

occur
Every event e that
The Principle of Divine Purpose:
by God
pre-ordained
occurs in the created world is
lacking
to
any
because God prefers a world containing e
e

7

.

Consider the Principle of Pre-ordination.

It is possible

to identify a number of versions of this principle with

varying strengths.

First of all, consider a weak version.

Let us say that God pre-conditions an event

e

if and only

if God efficaciously wills that some circumstances c

obtain and knows that if

c

obtain then

about by some independent cause.

e

will be brought

To say that God

efficaciously wills x is to say that God wills x and God's
willing x is a direct causal factor in x's obtaining.
Here is an example of pre-conditioning.

God wants a

certain soldier's ear to be struck off.

He knows that if

the soldier challenges Peter then Peter will freely and

independently choose to strike off the soldier's ear.

So

God efficaciously wills that the soldier challenge Peter,

hence the soldier does challenge Peter, and Peter strikes
off the soldier’s ear.

This last event was pre-

conditioned by God, but directly caused by Peter.
So to our weak version of the Principle of Pre-

ordination

:

Principle of Pre-ordination (weak): for every event e
that occurs in the created world, either God
efficaciously wills that e occur or God pre-conditions
e

Obviously we can construct a stronger version:
for every event
Principle of Pre-ordination (strong):
efficaciously
God
world,
created
that occurs in the
wills that e occur.

8

e

.

Even given the strong version, we can identify a liberal

interpretation and a conservative interpretation.

We

have said that God efficaciously wills x if and only if

God is a direct causal agent in x's obtaining.

Let us say

God concurs in x if and only if God efficaciously wills
that x, and there is some other agent a such that a is a

direct causal agent in x's obtaining.

Let us say God

fully efficaciously wills that x if and only if God

efficaciously wills that x and it is not the case that God
concurs in x.

Here, then is the distinction between

liberal and conservative versions of the strong principle:

Principle of Pre-ordination (strong-liberal):
for every
event e that occurs in the created world, either God
fully efficaciously wills that e occur or God concurs in
e

Principle of Pre-ordination (strong-conservative )
for
every event e that occurs in the created world, God
fully efficaciously wills that e occur.
:

A strong-conservative Principle of Pre-ordination is a

central element of any thorough-going occasionalism.

that

I

Note

have formulated the principle in such a way as to

allow that God's providential actions are contemporaneous
with their effects.

Pre-ordination need not, therefore,
So a view according to which the

imply prior ordination.

finger of Providence is continually prodding the world
along is perfectly compatible with the Principle of Pre-

ordination in any strength.

9

However, any philosopher

s

committed to the view that God acts from eternity
must
concede that whatever God wills now he has always
willed
and always will.

Occasionalism in Mai ebranche

'

s

hands has a positive

element concerning divine causation and a negative element

concerning natural causation.

The positive element is a

straightforward version of the strong-conservative
Principle of Pre-ordination.

The negative component is a

direct consequence of the positive component.
creatures exhibit causality.
is plain voluntarism.

Thus far the view described

What gives occasionalism its

particularity is a third component
component.

No

— a

kind of explanatory

The source of this component is Malebranche

commitment to the Principle of Divine Purpose.

'

What makes

God choose to create this world is that it is, according
to some measure,

the best.

By extension, what makes God

efficaciously will a given event

e

is that,

given the

antecedent circumstances on the occasion of his willing,
he prefers that e occur rather than not.

Part of what enters into the concept of goodness
here, and what contributes to God's preference,

is

simplicity of means for bringing about the relevant
effect.

God chose this world because it could be

conducted according to the simplest laws compatible with
such a diversity of effects.

God wills e because, on the

occasion that such and such circumstances hold,

10

e

is

in

accordance with the chosen laws.

This explains the

regularity in the world, and, thereby, the appearance of
causal interactions among created things.
C

.

The Malebranche-Arnauld Debate

Mai ebranche

'

s

occasionalism has been given a fair

amount of treatment in the secondary literature, although
it awaits a comprehensive and in depth study.

The natural

place to look for clear statement of and thorough argument
for the position is in his expressly philosophical works,

most notably the Search After Truth and the Dialogues on

Metaphysics

There is, however, another important source

.

of illumination of Malebranche

'

s

theory of causality and

that is in those largely theological writings in which

Malebranche is responding to critics.

By far the most

considerable of such works are those that constitute

Malebranche

'

s

contribution to the extended polemical

dispute with Antoine Arnauld.

This debate has been a

source of interest for those commentators concerned to

explicate Mai ebranche

'

s

position on the nature of ideas

(and also that of Arnauld,

needless to say.)

But the

debates over ideas were only a preamble to those over the
theological issues that each man found far more pressing.
There is hardly a single instance of English language

commentary that involves a serious study of the aspects of
the Malebranche-Arnauld debate concerned with the nature
of divine and natural causality.

11

Yet when we read

Arnauld

s

most voluminous and central contribution to the

debate, the Reflexions on Mai ebranche

Nature et de la Grace

uppermost in Arnauld'

,

s

'

we see that these concerns are

mind.

In the remainder of this chapter,

history of the debate,
(D)

Traite de la

s

I

will outline the

in the following three sections:

a brief account of the theological doctrine of

Jansenism, maintained by Arnauld and vigourously opposed
by Malebranche;

(E)

the circumstances of the meeting of

May 1679, and of the subsequent dissipation of mutual high

regard between the two;

the course of the debate in

(F)

terms of published material.
D

.

Jansenism

Jansenism is the name currently applied to one of the
most important theological reform movements within the

seventeenth century French Catholic Church.

9

The name

derives from the movement's spiritual founder, Cornelius
Jansen, a Dutch Catholic, Bishop of Ypres and author of

the controversial book Augustinus (published in 1640),

which contains an exposition and defence of the views on
grace of Saint Augustine.

The origins of Jansenism

predate the publication of Augustinus

,

however.

It

started to emerge as a self-conscious movement with the

introduction in 1633 of Jansen's lifelong correspondent
and spiritual ally, Jean du Vergers de Hauranne, the Abbe

12

de St. Cyran,
de Paris

,

into the religious community at Port Royal

whose Mother Superior was Angel ique Arnauld,

sister of Antoine Arnauld.

Even before that,

in the

latter part of the sixteenth century, the intellectual

foundation of the movement was being laid at Louvain in
the Netherlands where the University Chancellor, Michel
Baius, was disseminating the doctrines that would later be

codified in Augustinus 10
.

Antoine Arnauld'

s

association with Jansenism was, at

least in part, a political one (although his intellectual

commitment to the doctrines of the movement is beyond
suspicion).

The Arnauld family had a distinguished

history of resistence to the advance of the Jesuit

movement in France, Arnauld 's father having led the party
that succesfully kept the Jesuits from admission to the

University of Paris.

The Arnauld family stood for the

defence of traditional Gallicanism in the French Church,

which brought them into conflict with the Jesuit
influenced monarchy,

first through Louis XIII'

s

minister,

Cardinal Richelieu, a staunch supporter of the Jesuit
cause,

then through the regent Anne of Austria and later

with Louis XIV himself, who found in the established

Church the major source of resistence to his absolutism.
The doctrines espoused by Jansen and St. Cyran had a

natural appeal to those defending the integrity of

traditional Church in its political as well as its sacred

13

role.

The young Arnauld, already steeped in his family's

traditional religious conservatism, must have been an
eager disciple of the imposing and ascetic St. Cyran.

Augustinus was published in the Summer of 1640, some
months after the death of its author.

The flyleaf to the

first edition contained an alleged record of Jansen's

deathbed words in which he supposedly submitted

unreservedly to the authority of Rome.

Within a very

short time of publication, the book was under assault,

primarily from the Jesuit faction at the Sorbonne.

If the

deathbed submission had been taken seriously, perhaps
there would have been no movement.

But St. Cyran and the

Arnauld family, among others, clearly found the fury of
the assault on Augustinus too much to take phlegmatically.

When St. Cyran died in 1643, the leadership of the

movement fell naturally to Antoine Arnauld.

He responded

to the duty by publishing a treatise On the Frequent

Communion

,

which served as a focal point for subsequent

attacks by Jansenism's opponents.
It is in the context of its opposition to the Jesuit

movement that Jansenism acquires its philosophical
The Jesuits first appear in a major role on the

interest.

phil osophical stage in the protracted and bitter debates
de Auxi

1 i

is

,

concerning the nature of grace, between the

followers of the Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina and the

Dominican Thomists led by Dominico Banes.

14

It may be

worthwhile to review briefly some of the salient points
of
that dispute.
First, we need to introduce some

terminology with respect to grace.
After Augustine,

it became a Christian commonplace

that the performance of acts meriting salvation

(henceforth 'meritorious acts') was in some way dependent
on the grace of God 11
.

On even the most elementary

account, God's grace is divided into habitual and
actual.

Habitual grace, bestowed at baptism,

brings

about a more or less permanent condition of preparedness
to do meritorious acts,

but the actual performance of any

particular meritorious act requires its own particular
bestowal of actual grace.
Actual grace is said to be sufficient when it

suffices to permit the individual on whom it is bestowed
to perform a particular meritorious act.

On at least some

accounts (and this will be a source of contention) merely

sufficient grace can be resisted.

That is to say,

although it suffices to permit the relevant individual to

perform the relevant meritorious act, the relevant
individual may freely ignore the permission and choose not
to perform the act.

Sufficient grace is said to be

efficacious when its bestowal results in the actual

performance of the relevant meritorious act.

On at least

some views (again a point of contention), there is a

certain kind of grace bestowed by God which cannot be

15

.

resisted,

i.e.

it always results in meritorious acts.

Let

us call such irresistable grace intrinsically
efficacious,

since its efficacy depends only on its bestowal and not

also on a subsequent free co-operation on the part of the

recipient
Given this distinction and with an eye to the issue
of whether or not grace

(of either the sufficient or

efficacious kind) can be earned by meritorious actions, we
may distinguish four broad positions on the doctrine of
grace:

(a)

grace can be earned by merit and is always

merely sufficient;

(b)

grace can be earned by merit, but

once earned is always intrinsically efficacious;

(c)

cannot be merited, but is merely sufficient;

grace

(d)

grace

cannot be merited and is always intrinsically efficacious.

Doctrine (a) is what came to be regarded very early in the

history of the Church as the Pelagian heresy.
of my knowledge,

(b)

To the best

is not a doctrine propounded by any

major theologian.
It is with respect to doctrines (c) and (d) that the

dispute between Jesuit Molinists and Dominican Thomists
arises.

It had

long been a theological concern that

adherence to (d) has the apparent consequence that freewill must be denied, at least with respect to actions

meriting salvation.

But this consequence is against the

declarations of the Council of Trent^, in particular the
fol lowing:

16

'

Anathema to those who would say that the free will of
man, moved and excited by God, does not co-operate at
all, for disposing and preparing him for the grace of
justification, in accepting the excitation and call of
God, and that man cannot, even if he wills to, reject
them; but that, like an inanimate being, he does

absolutely nothing and remains entirely passive.
On the other hand,

(c)

suggested to most Christian

theologians from Augustine onward an unacceptable degree
of liberty on the part of men,

i.e.

a degree that

diminishes the extent of God’s Providence.
not unnaturally,

found itself dubbed

'

Position (c),

semi-pe lagiani sm

because of its partial admission of Pelagian doctrine. 14
I

think that it is safest to characterize the dispute

between Molinists and Thomists in this way:

(c),

with its associated theological difficulties,

position ascribed to Molinists by Thomists;

along

is the

(d)

along with

its problems is the position attributed to Thomists by

Molinists.

Each side, not surprisingly, resisted the

attribution made by the other.

When it comes to

characterizing the respective positions in a way that
would have been acceptable to the holders, the ground gets
less firm.

1

.

Here is an attempt.

Molinism 15
Schematically speaking, the Molinist position is best

characterized by (c), but the details of the account are
intended to preclude the alleged difficulties of that
position,

in particular the problem that (c)

17

seems to

entail an unacceptable curtailing of God's
Providence.

According to Molinism, man is always free to choose
whether or not to co-operate with a particular
bestowal of
sufficient grace, and sufficient grace is only ever
rendered efficacious by the free co-operation of man.
However, God is able to foresee what any given individual,
i,

would freely do when put in any particular situation,

s.

He can foresee this not by knowledge of his own will,

since if what

then

i

i

would do in

is not really free.

would do in

s

is determined by God's will

s

Neither can God foresee what

by knowledge of his own intellect, since

such knowledge is only of necessary truths.
to Molinism,

i

So,

according

God foresees the free acts of free agents by

a kind of middle knowledge,

the notorious scientia media.

The objects of such knowledge are contingently true

conditionals of the form "if

were in situation

i

s,

i

would freely choose to do a", which conditionals are not

dependent on God's will.
How does this preserve providence?
is that

Molinists adopt a weak version of the Principle of

Pre-ordination (see section
i.e.

The short answer

B)

.

Some events in the world,

the free choices of free individuals, are merely pre-

conditioned.

God knows, through his knowledge of his own

intellect, which individuals it is possible to create and
in what circumstances.

Furthermore, his middle knowledge

tells him that some possible worlds would not be
18

.

.

actualized even were he to do everything in his
power to
bring them about.
They involve certain free choices
on

the part of free individuals that could, but as
a matter
of fact would not be made if the appropriate
conditions

were set.

So,

by a combination of his knowledge of his

intellect and his middle knowledge, God knows which worlds
it is in his power to bring about.

Hence, the world that

God creates and conserves is one such that he foresaw and

chose all the events that take place in it.

Every state

of affairs in the actual world was pre-ordained by God,

even though many of them are the result of the free

choices of free agents who genuinely could have acted

differently
2

(

Banesian) Thomism 16
For Banes and his associates, the heart of the

Molinist error is the appeal to scientia media.

God,

being the primary cause of all things, is the direct and
immediate cause even of the free choices of free agents.
So his knowledge of contingent events which are the

natural consequences of such free choices is acquired

through what Banes calls "knowledge of causes".

God knows

what free choices he himself has made, and hence knows
what free choices men will make in consequence of that.
So Banes and his followers are committed to a strong

version of the Principle of Pre-ordination, but in order

19

to preserve human freedom it must be what

I

have dubbed a

'strong-liberal' version.
What account of freedom can be provided here?

Consider the following formula:
is free with respect to action a if and only if, all
the requisites for doing a having been posited, Scan do
a and S can refrain from doing a.
S

This is a rather crude modernisation of a standard

scholastic formula for freedom.

As Banes points out (with

respect to something like this), the strength of the
formula depends on the interpretation of 'requisites'
"all requisites... having been posited".

in

Banes claims

that (a version of) this formula is true if 'requisites’

means 'requisites prior to the moment of action'.

Hence

if the combination of all the antecedent natural

conditions up to the moment before my performing action a
with the ordinary conservative concourse of God is

compatible both with my performing a and with my

refraining from performing
to a.

a,

then

I

am free with respect

This is true even though my performing a under

these circumstances must be a direct and immediate effect
of God's simultaneous activity as primary cause.

Now we are in a position to see what Banes held with

respect to grace.

Meritorious actions are free in the

sense described above, although they cannot be performed

without a simultaneous bestowal of grace on God's part.

20

7

In a case in which the bestowal of grace
turns out to be

efficacious,

it is

intrinsically efficacious.

It does not

depend on a consequent free co-operation of the recipient,
because, given the conjunction of the antecedent

conditions with the bestowal,

it is not possible that the

relevant act not be performed.

In some cases the bestowal

of grace is merely sufficient.

These are cases in which

God,

knowing that the relevant individual will freely

choose not to perform the relevant meritorious act,

nonetheless bestows a grace that would directly result in
that act being performed were the agent to choose to

perform it.
3

.

Jansenism
The two positions outlined above were the chief

candidates for a Catholic theology of grace.

The debate

between the two camps ended up in the Papal court, at the
infamous Congregationes de Auxiliis (roughly the

Congresses on Aids [to Grace]).

These began in 1598 and

ended inconclusively in December 1611 with a Papal edict

prohibiting further debates on issues of grace and

asserting that the institutions of the Council of Trent
gave satisfactory guidance.

1

Under these circumstances, and with the prohibition

confirmed and reconfirmed in 1625, 1641 and 1654, the

Jansenist doctrine on grace appeared as an unwelcome third
contender.

Once again it is easier to put across what the

21
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position's opponents represented it as claiming than
what
its adherents actually held.

The first reaction among the critics of Augustinus
was that it resurrected the doctrines of Michel Baius. 18

Baianism was represented in the condemnatory papal bull
"?" as being an unsavory mixture of
Pelagianism

(concerning the natural state of man) and Calvinism or
even Socinianism (concerning man's condition after the
fall

from grace

.

The opposition to the doctrines of Baius had never

been clearly formulated (there was even unclarity about
how many propositions were condemned by the original
bull), but in the case of Jansenism, the opposition was

more organized and came up with a list of five heretical

doctrines to be found in Augustinus 19
.

The five propositions are as follows: 20

1.

Some commandments of God are impossible for just men
willing and striving according to the natural powers
they have; they lack, in addition, that grace which
would make those things possible.

2.

In the state of fallen nature, interior grace is never
resisted

3.

In order for merit and demerit in the state of fallen
nature, liberty from necessity is not required, but
rather liberty from constraint suffices.

4.

The semi-pelagians admitted the necessity of prevenient
interior grace for each particular action, even for the
beginning of faith; and in this they were heretics,
that they desired that this grace should be such that
the human will could either resist or obey it.

22

5.

It is semi-pelagian to say that Christ died or
that he
shed his blood for all men in general.

The first,

second and fourth propositions are unacceptable

for the same reason.

According to orthodoxy, God bestows

grace sufficient for merit on all men, but only in some
cases is this grace efficacious, and it is never

intrinsically efficacious.
righteous,

So if a man,

however

fails to obey the commandments,

it is only

because he has freely chosen to fail notwithstanding the
bestowal of sufficient grace.
to the second proposition,

More broadly, with respect

every failure to perform a

possible meritorious action is an instance of resisting
interior grace.

Clearly, the same remark holds with

respect to the fourth proposition.
The objection to the fifth proposition follows

directly from this.

Christ's death is understood to be an

instrumental event in releasing the grace required for
salvation.

If grace were only ever efficacious,

i.e.

were

never resisted, and only a minority merit salvation, then
grace could only have been bestowed on that minority;

Christ could only have died for those few.

But since the

supposition that grace is only ever efficacious is false,
and since sufficient grace is bestowed on all men,

it must

be that Christ died for everyone.

The third proposition is in a way the most

interesting.

The objection is fairly obvious.

23

Mere

freedom from constraint without freedom from necessity
is
no real

freedom at all.

What is interesting is that, as

with each of the other propositions, Arnauld argued

vigorously that this is not really part of Jansenist
doctrine at all.
So what is the doctrine that Arnauld held?
all,

First of

he held that there is a certain kind of grace that is

always present in meritorious actions.

If that grace is

bestowed, then it is, as a matter of fact, never resisted.
It could be resisted,

but it never is.

Notice that this

compatible with the existence of another type of actual
grace, merely sufficient, which is present in all those

cases where someone fails to perform a meritorious action

that is open to them.

The latter may be sufficient for

meritorious action even though it never is as a matter of
fact accompanied by such action; the former may not be

necessary for such action even though it and it alone

is

always present in the case of such action.
Such an account would save Jansenism from commiting
the errors of propositions one, two,

four and five.

It is

not clear to me whether that is the account that Arnauld
offered,

only that what he held was compatible with it.

It is the third proposition that Arnauld had most

difficulty dealing with, and indeed he ultimately seems to
have come to accept that Jansenism cannot avoid this

proposition.

Arnauld argued that meritorious action

24

requires freedom on the part of the agent, that freedom
involves the genuine power to choose to do otherwise,
and

that agent performing a meritorious action has such power
even though the bestowal of efficacious grace directly
d©t.ermines the choice of the agent.

important to

it is

notice that this is not the same position as that

propounded by Banes.

Banes said that an agent is

genuinely free so long as all the antecedent conditions
not including the actual bestowal of the grace are

compatible with the power to do otherwise.

Arnauld wanted

to have it that an agent is only free if given all the

conditions (bestowal of grace included) he or she still
has the power to do otherwise.

He seems to have wanted it

that actual grace determines the action of the meritorious
agent, that that action is free and that compatibi
false.

Ultimately, as

I

1

i

sm is

have pointed out, Arnauld came to

see that such an account was impossible.

I

suspect it is

this part of Jansenism that Malebranche had in mind when
he described the position as a "galimatias".

E.

o

i

The Circumstances of the Ma 1 ebranche-Arnau 1 d Debate
The characteristic of the Malebranche-Arnauld debate

that endures most firmly in the mind is the acrimony of
its conduct.

It is

little short of astonishing that two

figures of such considerable substance,

from the same

religion, with such considerable common ground

philosophically, should have treated each other with such
25
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evident lack of respect, and it is worth examining the
origins of the ill-feeling that seems to have pervaded
the

debate
It must be said,

at the outset, that

I

feel the

acrimony to have been exaggerated by many commentators.
It is to be noted that an abrasive stance is part of

Arnauld's stock in trade as a philosophical and
theological critic.

For example, the start of his

correspondence with Leibniz is marked by the umbrage that
the latter takes over Arnauld's early comments.

Arnauld's subsequent letters,

it is clear that he is

surprised by Leibniz' reaction, and
his plea for tolerance:

From

am sympathetic to

I

"nothing is further from my

character than the irritability that some people are
pleased to ascribe to me...

I

beg you, Monsieur, to

believe none of these things about me, but to believe that
the cause of my tactlessness is that

I

am used to writing

without formality ...." 22
At only one point, did the protagonists threaten to

reduce the debate from polemic to mud-slinging.

This was

when Arnauld discovered among the works at press at the

publishing house of Elzevier, the nascent Treatise on
Nature and Grace, some months after Malebranche had

promised to send him a copy for his comments.

Arnauld had

never received the promised copy, and was so incensed by
the discovery that he attempted to halt its publication.
26
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It is not clear from any of the subsequent
interaction

whether either party fully grasped or accepted the
role of
the other in what was really an unfortunate
misunderstanding, but nonetheless, the bitter

recriminations which followed from both sides receded over
time
But this is all to get ahead of the story.

Whatever

the state of the relationship between Malebranche and

Arnauld after the publication of the Treatise

it was

,

certainly not marked by professions of mutual admiration,
nor of friendship, and nor did it have the stamp of two

minds joined in the mutual pursuit of a common goal by

engaging in a respectful exchange of opinions.

This is

noteworthy both on personal and on philosophical grounds.
On the latter, because,

following the publication of the

Search After Truth in 1671, Arnauld announced himself a
fervent admirer.

Father Andre, Malebranche

biographer tells us

"M.

'

first

s

Arnauld was one of the first who

gave vogue to the book The Search After Truth

.

I

have no

doubt at all that this sprang from a sincere esteem for
that beautiful work." 23

By 1683, Arnauld'

s

treatise On

the True and False Ideas was devoted to an assault on the

central tenets of the Search

.

What could have caused this

about face?
Andre hints at, and Ginette Dreyfus in her commentary
24
on the Treatise supplies, a likely explanation.
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Arnauld

s

believed that he had found in the author of the Recherche
a

philosopher and theologian of international standing who

would champion the Jansenist position on grace.

In short,

Arnauld read the Search as a Jansenist treatise.

When he

discovered that nothing was further from Malebranche

'

intentions, he saw instead an extremely pernicious

philosophy, dangerous both to Jansenism and to piety in
general

.

Such was the spirit of the age that to be

marginally on the wrong side of the finest distinction was
to be hopelessly and dangerously mistaken.
In 1678,

in a celebrated case, Malebranche persuaded

a young Jansenist priest,

Michel de le Vassor, of the

confusion at the heart of the Jansenist doctrine on
grace. 25

Le Vassor became an ardent an active

"Malebranchist"

Malebranche

'

s

,

spreading widely a pamphlet containing

own views.

This was, needless to say,

deeply troubling to Arnauld and Port-Royal.

In May of the

next year, Father Quesnel, a mutual friend of Arnauld and

Malebranche, brought together these two, as well as le
Vassor,

in an attempt to bring about an intellectual

reconciliation.

According to Andre, Malebranche, who was

first to speak, was unable to get a hearing from the
26
voluble and overexcited Arnauld.

The outcome was that

the meeting broke up inconclusively, with Malebranche

promising to write for all those present a treatise
explaining his position on grace.
28
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The Treat i se on Nature and Grac

s

was written in

August 1679, and sent to the Marquis de Roucy to be handed
on to Arnauld at the end of the year.
1679,

Arnauld,

However,

fearing persecution from the crown,

France for the Netherlands, never to return.

never replied.

Malebranche,

left

Evidently,

he never received his copy of the Treatise and,

silence,

in June

of course,

impatient of Arnauld’

sent the manuscript to the publisher Elzevier in

Amsterdam in June 1680.

Arnauld discovered the manuscript

there in the next month and, angered at the slight he
perceived, attempted (unsuccesful ly

publication halted.

)

to get the

"It is not" he wrote to Roucy "among

the rules of honesty to publish, after having asked for my

judgement, without having had it in the meantime." 27
is not clear to me that the

It

misunderstanding was ever

cleared up, and although the subsequent debate was largely
doctrinal,

it was never,

after this incident, conducted

with good grace.
F.

The Debate in Print 28

In a letter accompanying Malebranche

"Response to Book

I

'

of the Reflexions...",

s

substantial
the author

makes some recommendations about what should be read in

order to follow the course of the debate:
The first [item] consists in the first seven chapters of
the second part of the third book of the Search After
One
Truth, in which I treat of the nature of ideas.
29

e

must include also the Elucidation which is on the
same
subject [Elucidation X].
The second is M. Arnauld's
book On the True and False Ideas
My Response to that
book makes the third; and the De fens of M. Arnauld,
against my response, the fourth. The fifth piece
consists in the three letters that I wrote on his
Defense
And since M. Arnauld did not reply to those, I
put for the sixth piece of the process the Treatise on
Nature and Grace in the Rotterdam edition of 1684, in
which is found the Elucidation concerning the miracles
of the ancient law, because it is the edition which M.
Arnauld has used... The seventh is the Dissertation of
M. Arnauld against the elucidation about which I have
just been talking.
The eighth, my Response to this
Dissertation
And finally the ninth is his first volume
of Philosophical and Theological Refelxions
part of my
reply to which I am now sending you.
(OC VIII 623-4)
.

.

,

.

.

These instructions take us about half way through the

debate in terms of published material, although from the

publication of On the True and False Ideas in 1683 to the
publication of Book

I

of the Reflexion s was a period of

less than two years.

Malebranche wrote this letter at an important
juncture in the debate.

The subject matter of the

exchanges in this early period may be divided into three
groups.

Arnauld's principal target

In the early going,

was Mai ebranche

1

s

theory of ideas, the notorious theory of

the vision in God, according to which the true location of
all our ideas is the mind of God.
in detail

The view is presented

in part two of book three of the Search

,

along

with arguments in rejection of all the known competitors.

Arnauld believed that the theory of the vision in God
motivated all of Mai ebranche

'

s

theology (a fact

Malebranche vehemently denied), hence his preliminary
30
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response to the Search was directed against the parts
of
that work relevant to this theory.

On the True and False

Ideas is given over entirely to an attack on the vision
in
God,

and the subsequent works, the Response by the author

9l the Search After Truth

the Defense of WL Arnauld and

,

the Three Letters maintain the same controversy.

The discussion of the Treatise on Nature and Grace

represents a departure, as explained in the previous
section.

The subject is changed from the theory of ideas

to the more theologically oriented issues of grace,

freedom and the nature of divine action.

Arnauld had,

anyway, regarded the debate spawned by On the True and

False Ideas

,

as a prelude to debate on these weightier

matters
The Dissertation of M

against the Treatise

,

.

Arnauld is his first venture

and is directed, as noted in the

letter above, against the fourth elucidation of that work,

added in the edition of 1684.

The Dissertation is not yet

a direct attack on the central doctrines of the Treatise

,

but nonetheless it singles out for attention an issue that
will be at the heart of the debate up to (and even beyond)

Arnauld 's death - the manner of God’s operation in the
world.

The Dissertation and Malebranche

’

s

response to it

are concerned with the manner of God's miraculous action,

but Malebranche claimed,

31

in his response to the

Dissertation

that the fourth elucidation "established
the

,

principles necessary for understanding [the Treatise ]." 29
This exchange is a final warm-up joust before
the

main event.

Arnauld's Philosophical and Theological

Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace,
P^-^lished in three substantial volumes,

constitutes his

major effort against the philosophy of Malebranche.

The

first volume appeared alone in 1685 and elicited a

response from the latter in the form of three published
letters in 1686.

The passage quoted at the beginning of

this section is taken from a prefatory note appended to
the first of these letters.

The second and third volumes

of the Reflexions followed later in 1686,

and Malebranche

again responded in the form of published letters early in
the next year.
The first period of the debate was brought to a close
by the publication of Mai ebranche

in 1687,
1

etters

.

.

.

concerning those of M

.

Arnauld

.

'

Four

s

The letters of

Arnauld in question are the nine collected in the winter
of 1685 under the title Letters of M

the Sorbonne

,

to Rev

.

.

Arnauld

Father Malebranche

.

,

Doctor of

They cover all

aspects of the debate.
In 1694,

the year of Arnauld's death, the two briefly

exchanged opinions once again.

The occasion for this

exchange was a debate in the J ourna 1 des Scavans in March
of that year between Malebranche and Pierre-Sy 1 vain Regis
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on two issues: the perennial question of the
nature of

ideas and an issue provoked by Mai ebranche

’

s

view that the

pleasures of the senses are sufficient to render man
happy.

In the Journal des Scavans for June 28th 1694,

Arnauld published the first of four letters against
Mai ebranche

'

s

opinions on these matters, opening with this

profession:
I
thought I had laid these two points so well and truly
open, the first in the treatise On the True and False
Ideas and in the Defense of that treatise; the second
in the first book of Reflexions on your new system of
nature and grace, and in the Dissertation on the
supposed goodness of pleasures of the senses that I
flattered myself that you found yourself reduced to
silence on these matters.
(OC IX 1013)
,

,

The first two letters, along with Mai ebranche

'

replies,

s

were published in successive issues of the journal in June
and July 1694.

The third and fourth letters were not

published until 1698, four years after Arnauld'

s

death,

but they elicited the rather bizarre spectacle of a

response to a dead author, written by Malebranche in March
1699,

and published in 1704 as an appendix to the essay

Against the Prohibition

,

a defence of the Treatise against

the criticisms, primarily those of Arnauld, that had led
to its being placed on the index of proscribed works.

Against the Prohibition is the last chapter in the

Malebranche-Arnauld debate

- a final

and comprehensive

effort at vindication of the unorthodox views that

provoked the years of bitter and polemical dispute.
33
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Notes
1.

Although occasionalism is commonly reported as a theory
specifically concerning mind-body interaction, Steven
M. Nad 1 er has argued very persuasively that the primary
motivation for seventeenth century occasional ists was
the formulation of a thoroughgoing account of causation
in the natural world.
See "Occasionalism and the MindBody Problem", Oxford Studies in the History of
Phi losophy 2 (1990).

2.

This is the name used by Bas van Fraasen in Chapter 1
of his Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1989) page 350, n. 10.

3.

Summarized by Jonathan Kvanvig and Hugh McCann in
"Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World"
where they describe deism as the view that "God is... a
sort of cosmic engineer Who, in the beginning, created
a world that operates according to certain immutable
laws, including laws of conservation.
Once the
universe was in place it was no longer necessary for
God to be active in sustaining it, nor is it today.
He
may, on some accounts, intervene periodically to cause
certain adjustments or changes within the universe or
its operations, but no continuous activity on God's
part is needed simply to keep it in existence" (p. 14).

4.

Perhaps this is what Descartes has in mind in part two
of the Principles where he suggests that God causes the
continued existence of substances while the changes in
See AT VIIIA
their modes are caused by natural means.
61-62; CSM I 240.
Descartes' idea seems to be summed
up most succinctly in The World Chapter 7: "...it must
be said that God alone is the cause of all the motions
in the world in so far as they exist and in so far as
they are rectilinear; but it is the various
dispositions of matter which render them irregular and
Likewise, the theologians teach us that God is
curved.
also the author of all our actions, in so far as they
have some goodness, but it is the various dispositions
of our wills that can render them evil" (AT XI 46-47;
CSM I 97). This will be taken up in detail in Chapter
II

5.

for example, Leibniz in "Necessary and Contingent
Truths" at C 22 (translated in Leibniz Philosophical
(London:
Writings M. Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson eds
Dent, 1973) page 102.)
See,

:

.
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6.

.

,

An example of such a view seems to be found in St.
Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles Book III, part
ar“ti c l e 70, wherein he distinguishes between
God as
primary efficient cause and natural entities as
instrumental causes.

i,

7.

For a detailed account of the traditional doctrine of
Providence which makes use of the three principles I
describe here, see Thomas P. Flint "Two Accounts of
Providence" in Thomas V. Morris ed. Divine and Human
Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pages
147-181.
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for example, Stephen M. Nadler Arnauld and the
Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton
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(April 1991) pages 183-199.

9.
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pages 318-530.
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Origins of Jansenism (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1936)
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13.
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Xavier Bachelet in the Dictionnaire de Theologie
Cathol ique t.2 pages 38-111.
,

11.
14.
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seems to be that in the Dictionnaire de Theologie
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15.
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^
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CHAPTER

II

CAUSATION AMONG THE CARTESIANS
Introd u ction

A.

Chapter III is intended to establish a working

account of Malebranche

'

s

version of occasionalism, as

presented in his major philosophical works, particularly
in the Search and

Dialogues

basis for the examination,

.

This will serve as the

in Chapters IV and V,

of the

debate with Arnauld on issues related to causality.

In

this chapter, by way of a preliminary to the project

described above,

I

want to make some examination of the

Cartesian antecedents of Malebranche

'

s

occasional ist

theory
It is part of my thesis

(a none too

startling part)

that Malebranche is a very orthodox Cartesian
in Chapter III,

1

I

.

argue,

that the argument for occasionalism as it

appears in the Dialogues is grounded on the most
fundamental Cartesian principles.

Where Descartes is

sometimes inclined to avoid confronting certain perhaps

uncomfortable consequences of his views, Malebranche will
always accept the consequences unflinchingly.

Many people

have seen occasionalism as an inevitable consequence of
in particular the

the basic tenets of Cartesianism,

radical dualism, the ontological status of modes of

substances and the "constant creation" account of God's

sustaining activity in the world.
38

^

I

will

look at the way

in which Descartes handles the problems arising from
these

tenets.

Descartes develops no complete, coherent

theory of causation, even though he is prepared to make
use of certain causal principles, most famously his strong

principle about the ontological relationship between
causes and effects in Meditation III
Mai ebranche

'

s

3
.

Nonetheless, given

evident debt to him, it will be valuable to

extract some kind of causal theory from Descartes' views
and to note the points at which he is most evasive.

These

are exactly the points at which the thorough-going

occasional ist will not flinch.
In the main section (Section B) of this chapter,

I

shall consider Descartes relationship to occasionalism.
In the first part,

shall examine what he has to say on

I

the question of the degree of God's causal involvement in
the world.

It turns out that Descartes is,

his own profession,
part,

I

a

committed theist.

at least by

In the second

will consider the problems that this poses for him

with respect to natural causation.

In the third,

I

will

-

evaluate two suggestions concerning Descartes' supposed
partial occasionalism: the first, that he is an

occasional ist about mind-body interaction; and the second,
a suggestion that has some currency,

that Descartes is an

occasional ist about body-body interactions and about body
to mind interactions.

I

conclude that neither suggestion

is an accurate representation of Descartes'
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intentions,

s

although there is a sense in which he may be described
as
a thoroughgoing occasional ist malgre lui.

Some of the immediate followers of Descartes were

evidently driven towards an occasional ist position more

readily than he himself was prepared to be.
section of this chapter,

I

shall

In the last

look briefly at the

argument of Geraud de Cordemoy, in the Discernement du
Corps et de L ame
’

,

intended to demonstrate the

impossibility of natural interactions involving bodies,
and concluding that the correlations between such natural

events must be the product of God's intervention.

De La

Forge and Geulincx were similarly motivated, although, as
I

contend, none of these arguments rests on the best of

premises.

My opinion is that by far the best argument for

occasionalism appears in Dialogue VII of Mai ebranche
Dialogues on Metaphysics

.

'

This will be presented in

Chapter III.
B

.

Descartes and Occasionalism

Was Descartes a pre-cursor of modern occasionalism?
A small

industry has grown up around this question in

recent literature 4 and one of the interesting products of
,

what has been written is the development of the view that

Descartes was a partial occasional ist

.

He held,

so the

view goes, that apparent causal relationships between some
natural entities are really causal while those between
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'

others are only occasional; for example that there is
a
real causal relationship between volitions of created

minds and bodily events, but not vice-versa, or that there
are real causal relationships between mental states but
not between physical states.
I

am not convinced that the evidence on Descartes

alleged occasionalism is at all conclusive or even
consistent.

Descartes was never concerned with

establishing a fully-fledged causal theory.
is worth

However,

it

examining this question given the commitments to

Cartesianism of both Malebranche and Arnauld.
have claimed,

in the Introduction,

Since

I

that causal theories

such as occasionalism are largely designed to answer the

question "what is the extent of God's causal activity and
what room does that leave for natural causes",

I

shall

approach Descartes’ view of causality by examining what
answer he would give to this question, employing the

distincitons established in Section B of Chapter

1

.

Descartes on God

'

s

I.

Providence

In a pivotal article in the second part of the

Principles of Phi losophy

,

Descartes, having considered the

nature of motion in general, as well as of motion as it

actually occurs in our world, makes the following move:
"After this consideration of the nature of motion, we must
look at its cause"

(

Principles pt
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.

I,

art.

36).

5

What

follows in this and the next article is, to my
mind, the

most perplexing passage in the whole Cartesian corpus:
This is, in fact, twofold: first, there is the universal
and primary cause - the general cause of all the motions
in the world; and second, there is the particular cause
which produces in an individual piece of matter some
motion that it previously lacked. Now, as far as the
general cause is concerned, it seems clear to me that
this is no other than God himself.
In the beginning he
created matter along with its motion and rest; and now,
merely by his regular concurrence, he preserves the same
amount of motion and rest as he put there in the
beginning... Thus, God imparted various motions to the
parts of matter when he first created them, and he now
preserves all this matter in the same way and by the
same process by which he originally created it...
[Art. 37]
From God's immutability we can also know
certain rules or laws of nature, which are the secondary
and particular causes of the various motions we see in
particular bodies. (AT VIIIA 61; CSM I 240)

It must be admitted that

I

find the doctrine expressed in

this last sentence almost incomprehensible.

part of this section,

I

In the second

will attempt to cast some light on

what Descartes held with respect to secondary causes.
the meantime,

In

let us pay attention to the doctrine of

divine causality advanced in article 36.

Descartes believed in a very simple ontology for the
natural world.

There are substances and modes of

substances, the latter being simply ways in which the

substances exist.

6

One might add what Descartes calls

"simple natures" and also eternal truths, although the

exact status of these is unclear.

7

Given this scheme, we

can distinguish between the following kinds of states of
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affairs requiring causation.

First of all, the existence

of any given substance requires a cause;

second, the

having of a given property or mode by a given substance
requires a cause.

With some minor reservations we might

accept this as a complete catalogue of the states of
3-f

fairs requiring causes for Descartes.

However, one such

reservation turns out to be significant.

I

will claim

that it is necessary to add to this list states of affairs

involving the changing of the modes of some substance or
the coming to have of some mode by some substance.

What is the extent of God's causal agency on
Descartes' view?

Does God cause the existence of all

substances, or only of some?

Does God cause every

instance of the having of a mode by a substance, or only
or none at all?

some,

Let us take these last two questions in turn.

The

answer to the first qestion is straightforward enough. It
is that God is indeed the cause of all

substances.

We

find Descartes giving outright affirmations of this, as in
the following,

from part one of the Principles

:

"God

alone is the true cause of everything which is or can be"
(AT VI

I I

A 14; CSM

I

201).

He also argues for it, as when

he argues that each thing requires to be constantly

created in order to remain in existence.

argument appears nowhere, so far as
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I

The complete

can work out, but

must be put together from fragments of arguments at

different points in Descartes' corpus.

8

In the Replies to the First Objections to the

Meditations

Q
,

Descartes argues for the conclusion that a

substance needs an efficient cause for each moment of its
existence.

The argument starts with this premise:

"the

concept of a cause is, strictly speaking, applicable only
for as long as the cause is producing its effect"
108;

CSM II 78)).

(AT VII

Since he takes it to follow from this

that a cause is not temporally prior to its effect, he

clearly intends by this premise the following:

Premise

1: For every state of affairs s, if s requires a
cause, then s requires that there be a cause producing s
at the time at which s obtains. 10

The next premise of the argument is this:

"I

regard the

divisions of time as being separable from each other, so
that the fact that

I

now exist does not imply that

I

shall

continue to exist in a little while unless there is a
cause which, as it were, creates me afresh at each moment
of time"

(AT VII 109; CSM II 78).

is that this claim about Descartes'

The first thing to note

existence can be

generalized to apply to any substance.

Descartes is

engaged in a discussion of the question whether or not it
is possible for anything to be a cause of itself,

own self serves as an example.

So,

and his

any state of affairs

of some substance's existing at a certain time t requires
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.

.

a cause.

From the fact that that substance existed at

some prior time,

it does not follow that the substance

will exist at t.

Premise 2: For every state of affairs s involving the
existence of some substance x at a time t, s requires a
cause
The following is Descartes' conclusion:

Conclusion For every state of affairs s involving the
existence of some substance x at a time t, s requires
that there be a cause c such that c is producing s at t.
:

Descartes takes it to follow from this that there is no
important difference between the creation of a substance
(its being caused to exist at the first instant of its

existence) and the preservation of it (its being caused to
exist at each subsequent moment)
At this point in this set of replies, Descartes

abandons the argument.

He has established to his

satisfaction what would be required in order for a
substance to be efficient cause of itself.

It would have

to be something capable of preserving itself at each

moment of its existence.

In order to see how he

establishes that no substance other than God is so
capable, we need to turn to the geometrical presentation
of the argument of the Meditations found in the Replies to
11
the Second Objections.
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I

In the second axiom of the geometrical presentation

Descartes very briefly summarizes what has been achieved
in the above argument:

Axiom I
There is no relation of dependence between the
present time and the immediately preceding time, and
hence no less a cause is required to create it in the
first place (AT VII 165; CSM II 116).
:

The argument also employs the following axioms:

Axiom VII The will of a thinking thing is drawn
voluntarily and freely... but nevertheless inevitably,
towards a clearly known good. Hence, if it knows which
perfections it lacks, it will straightaway give itself
these perfections, if they are in its power.
:

Axiom VIII Whatever can bring about a greater or more
difficult thing can also bring about a lesser thing.
:

Axiom IX: It is a greater thing to create or preserve a
substance than to create or preserve the attributes or
properties of a substance. (AT VII 166; CSM 117)
It follows immediately from axioms VIII and IX that

whatever can create or preserve

a

substance is also able

to create or preserve the attributes of a substance.

Since perfections are attributes, whatever can create or

preserve a substance can create or preserve perfections.
From axiom VII we know that any thinking substance which
can create or preserve the perfections in itself will do
so.

No imperfect thinking substance has done so, hence no

imperfect thinking substance is capable of creating or

preserving the perfections in itself.

If no imperfect

thinking substance is capable of creating or preserving
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the perfections in itself, then no imperfect thinking

substance is capable of creating or preserving itself.
Hence God must be the cause of the creation and

preservation of every imperfect thinking substance.
At this point, Descartes seems to believe that no

argument is required to show that the same holds for non-

thinking substances.

The corollary of the foregoing

argument, he tells us,

is that "God created the heavens

and the earth and everything in them" (AT VII 169; CSM II
In fact he does observe that a body cannot be the

119).

creator or preserver of itself at AT VII 118 (CSM

II

84).

This long and rather dense argument is very

significant in the current context, because Malebranche
found in the "constant creation" account of God's

activity, the basis for his rejection of all secondary
causes.

1

2

In brief,

his argument is that God must create

each temporal stage of a substance in some state or other,
i.e. with certain modes.

notion of a mode which

is,

This depends on the Cartesian
roughly, that it is a way in

which a substance may exist.

The distinction between

substances and modes is not a "real" one.

^

Therefore,

if

God causes the existence of each substance at each moment
of its existence,
it has.

he must also cause it to have the modes

This argument will be presented in detail in

Chapter III.

But what did Descartes think on this point?
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Does he believe that God is the cause of every
instance of
the having of a mode by a substance?

There are apparently conflicting passages with

respect to this question.
l

Chapter

7

of The World is

a FCT e ly devoted to explaining the following observation!

"from the mere fact that [God] continues to preserve
[matter],

it follows that there must be many changes in

its parts which cannot,

it seems to me,

properly be

attributed to the action of God" (AT XI 37; CSM

I

92-3).

Evidently, there are some states of affairs that are not

caused by God.

It

is

interesting to note that the states

of affairs Descartes attributes to natural causes are

instances not of a substance having some mode, but rather
of it changing its modes,

and hence, that if we are to

accept this as representing Descartes' mature position on
divine causation, we must add such states of affairs to
our catalogue of what requires a cause.

What is

attributable to God, according to Descartes' account in
The World

,

is the existence of each substance at each

moment and the conservation in it of its motive force,

which is equivalent to its tendency to maintain its
present state.

Of course,

this passage from The World is

concerned with physical substance.

There is no reason,

however, to suppose that, at the time he was writing that
not all the phenomena of the physical world are properly
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a 't't r'it utabl e to God’s action,
)

he would not have held the

same with respect to mental substances.

On the other hand,

in what seems to me to be a very

important passage in the correspondence with Princess
Elizabeth, 14 Descartes writes:
I must say at once that all the reasons that prove that
God exists and is the first and unchangeable cause of
all effects that do not depend on human free will prove
similarly, I think, that He is also the cause of all
those that do so depend.
For the only way to prove that
He exists, is to consider Him as a supremely perfect
being; and He would not be supremely perfect if anything
could happen without coming entirely from Him (AT IV
313-4; K 180)

The natural way to read this passage is as saying that God
is the

(entire) cause of every state of affairs requiring

a cause.

The kind of effect that "depend

[s]

on human free

will" is an action, which is a mode of a substance.

So

this passage informs us that God is the cause not only of
the existence of substances, but of their having the modes

they do also.

It is

important to note the language used

here in the first sentence.

God is "the first and

unchangeable cause" of everything requiring a cause.
is surely meant to

This

leave open the possibility that,

although God is the entire cause of everything, natural
substances may play a secondary causal role.
The conflicting passages suggest two different ways
of interpreting Descartes on the primary/secondary

distinction.

On the view suggested in The World
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,

God

creates each thing that exists, sustains it in existence
and sustains in it the power necessary for it to engage in
causal interactions with other created substances.

Changes in the modes of substances are brought about

entirely by the interactions among them.

On the view

suggested by the letter to Elizabeth, God creates each
thing that exists, sustains it in existence and causes it
to have all the modes it has.

No state of affairs fails

to be caused entirely by God.

There is a secondary sense

of cause according to which some created substances may be

thought of as causes.

For example, some effects may be

said to "depend on" human free will.

Which,

if either,

of

these is the right picture, depends on what Descartes

thought sbout secondary causes.

This will be examined in

the next section.

2

.

Descartes on Secondary Causes
We have sketched two possibilities regarding

Descartes' distinction between primary and secondary
causation.

Each of these may be described as theist

according to the account given at the start of Chapter
In the first case,

I.

he regards God as contributing part of

what is required for each state of each substance

existence of the substance and its motive force

- the

- and

created substances as contributing the rest, causing the

substance to come to have the modes it has by interacting
with it according to the laws of nature.
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On the second

account, God contributes everything to each state of each

substance in one sense of 'cause', and created substances

contribute in another sense of 'cause'.

Each of these

views is compatible with the doctrine of Divine
Providence,

in particular with some version of the

Principle of Pre-ordination.

In the first case,

the

relevant principle would be "weak" as explained in Chapter
I;

in the second case it would be "strong-liberal". 15

Which of these accounts best represents Descartes'
mature thinking on the primary/secondary distinction?

It

will be necessary to examine more closely what he has to

say about secondary causes in order to see what role they

play in his position.

Ultimately, the two accounts can be

shown to be compatible, that each involves a concept of

Providence employing a weak Principle of Pre-ordination.
At article 37 of part II of the Principles

Descartes

,

tells us that the laws of nature are "the secondary and

particular causes of the various motions we see in bodies"
(AT VI I I A 62; CSM

I

240).

article, unexplained claim.

in this

This is a strange and,
For one thing, all of

Descartes contemporaries would surely have regarded causes
as agents of some kind,

ontology,

substances would surely have been the natural

candidates for causes.
a

and hence, given Descartes

law can be,

For another,

it is hard to see how

on its own, the cause of anything.
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1

:

^

is

important to see that,

for Descartes,

a

law of

nature is not a thing in the way that a substance or even
a mode is.

Corresponding to each of the laws is some

volition of God, an eternal truth which

is the

content of

that volition and an attribute bestowed on substances as a

result of their being governed by this law.

In The World

,

Descartes explains his thinking on this point more
clearly
I do not want to delay any longer telling you by what
means nature alone can untangle the confusion of the
chaos and what are the laws that God has imposed on
it... By nature here, I do not mean some goddess or
imaginary power.
Rather, I am using this word to
signify matter in itself, in so far as I am considering
it taken together with all the qualities I have
attributed to it, and under the condition that God
continues to conserve it in the same way.
(AT XI 36-37;
CSM I 92, my emphasis)

Descartes seems to hold the following about the causes of

particular states of affairs in the world.

God creates

matter, whose essence is extension and its related

attributes of mobility, divisibility, flexibility,
impenetrability, etc., and conserves it "in the same way"
in which he created it.

Since,

at the creation, the parts

of matter were moving in violent disorder,

conserving it

in the same way could not be equivalent to keeping it in

the same state.

Rather,

it amounts to maintaining the

same amount of motion and rest in it.

Given that these

are the conditions under which matter exists,
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it is of the

nature of the parts of matter to interact in certain ways

which explain the phenomena that we see. 17
The many changes in the constitution of the parts of

matter are "not properly attributed to God" but, in
Descartes words,

"I

therefore attribute them to nature",

which is nothing other than matter itself (AT XI 37; CSM
93).

I

It turns out that this amounts to agent causation.

In the Synopsis to the Meditations

,

Descartes tells us:

Body, taken in the general sense, is a substance, so
that it too never perishes.
But the human body, in so
far as it differs from other bodies, is simply made up
of a certain configuration of limbs and other accidents
of this sort; whereas the human mind is not made up of
any accidents in this way, but is a pure substance.
(AT
VII 14; CSM II 10)

This passage makes clear a doctrine that Descartes employs

without explaining throughout the rest of his
philosophical writing.

There is an assymetry between

mental and material substance,

in that individual minds

are "pure" or genuine substances, while individual bodies
are not.

Only body "taken in general" ("matter" as

Descartes is calling it in The World

)

is a genuine

material substance.
So when Descartes claims that "nature" is the cause
of the diversity of motions in the physical world,

explaining that by "nature" he means "matter itself", he
is

attributing causal agency to a created substance.

the case of mental secondary causes,
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it is clear that

In

Descartes holds these to be mental substances, minds,
also.
It should be clear,

then, that despite the unusual

language of article 37 of Part

II

of the Principles there

is nothing odd about the kinds of things Descartes regards

as secondary causes.

they act?

World

,

They are substances.

What role do they play?

But how do

Once again,

in The

the idea seems to be that they cause changes of

modes, and that God does not cause such changes.

The

reason for the latter claim is that God's action is
immutable.

What God contributes to creation never

changes, yet what happens in creation is constantly

changing.

Therefore something other than God must be

responsible for these changes.
How is such a view compatible with what Descartes
says in the correspondence with Elizabeth?

There he says

"God is the universal cause of everything in such a way as
to be the total cause of everything; and so nothing can

happen without His will" (K 180).

Surely this language is

strong enough so as not to preclude changes in the modes
of substances.

The account of secondary causes in The World seems to
be borne out by the following from Descartes' replies to

the objections of Gassendi to the Meditations

:

An architect is the cause of a house and a father of his
child only in the sense of being the causes of their
coming into being ( causae secundum fieri); and hence,
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once the work is completed, it can remain in existence
quite apart from the ’cause' in this sense.
But the sun
is the cause of the light which it emits, and God is the
cause of created things, not just in the sense that they
are the causes of the coming into being of these things,
but also in the sense that they are causes of their
being ( causae secundum esse).
(AT VII 369; CSM II 254)
In the case of an architect,

although God must be the

cause of the house's enduring, the architect is the cause
of the change in the arrangement of matter which

constitutes the house's coming into being.
This distinction need not, however, be seen as

incompatible with what Descartes has written to Elizabeth.
It is evident that Descartes is here distinguishing two

different kinds of cause, and that the primary kind
(

'

causa secundum esse'

)

may be sufficient to produce not

just existence but the changes in modes of substances.

In

terms of the Principle of Pre-ordination, the causa

secundum esse may be a pre-conditioning cause with causae

secundum fieri being the direct and immediate causes of
change; or else, the former could be the direct and

immediate cause of every state of affairs in one sense

while the latter are causes of some in another.
As Elizabeth presses Descartes on this question in
18
he reveals what appears to me to be
the correspondence,

the crucial fact about his view of the primary/secondary

distinction.

Clearly the most difficult case for someone who holds
that God is the entire cause of every state of affairs
55

requiring a cause is

of free choices of human wills.

"that

This is how Descartes handles that problem in the letter
to Elizabeth of January 1646:

Before [God] sent us into the world, he knew exactly
what all the inclinations of our will would be; it is He
who gave us them, it is He who has disposed all other
things outside us so that such and such objects would
present themselves to our senses at such and such times,
on the occasion of which He knew that our freewill would
determine us to such and such an action. (AT IV 353-4; K
189)

What is described here is surely pre-conditioning as

explained in Chapter

We said that God pre-conditions

I.

an event e if and only if God efficaciously wills that

some set of circumstances
occur.

c

obtains and

c

causes e to

The way in which a free action of a human will is

dependent on God is just that.

God knows how all wills

will respond to whatever circumstances they are placed in,

and creates the world along with its laws in such a way

that human wills will always be in the appropriate

situation to form volitions according to God’s design.
It is not hard to see how this explanation can be

extended to all secondary causes.

Human volitions are the

hard case because it is not easy to see how pre-

conditioning leaves room for freedom.

But in the case of

physical causation, the pre-conditioning account of God's

action fits very well with what has been said in The
World.

God creates matter with certain attributes, endows
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a.t

the first moment of creation with various motions

and sustains it according to certain laws.

All of this

together is sufficient to bring it about that parts of
matter will interact in such a way that God's design for
the physical world is accomplished.
In the case both of free agents and that of the

physical world the direct and immediate cause of changes
in the modes of created substances is natural.

However,

when we see that the actions of created substances have
each been pre-conditoned by God’s action in creating and

sustaining the world, we can see what sense there is in
saying that everything,
substances,

is

including changes in modes of

ultimately attributable to divine agency.

God is the "entire" or "total", though not the immediate,

cause of everything that requires a cause.

3

.

The Extent of Descartes

1

Occasionalism

One or another form of occasionalism has been taken
to follow from Descartes' views on causation in a number
of instances.

Perhaps most notoriously, occasionalism is

taken to be an inevitable consequence of the radical

dualism between mind and body.

Occasionalism has

traditionally been represented as a theory explaining
apparent mind-body interactions, although, as has been

pointed out, this is largely a misrepresentation.

1

However, Descartes was challenged by his most acute
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1

critics on the question how it is that two substances as

radically different as mind and body can interact.
The most famous instance of this challenge is found
in Descartes'

correspondence with Elizabeth.

In her

letter to Descartes dated 6/16 May 1643, she writes:
I ask you to tell me how the soul
of man can determine
the corporeal spirits to make voluntary actions (being
only a thinking substance).
Because it seems to me that
all determination of movement amounts to the propulsion
of that which is moved, by means of being pushed by that
which moves it.
(AT III 661)

Arnauld, too, was puzzled by this.

"It can scarcely be

understood" he writes in a letter directed toward

Descartes "how an incorporeal thing can move a corporeal
one"

(OA XXXVIII 83).

This puzzle seems to have led

Arnauld, at least, to occasionalism about interactions

between minds and bodies. 20
It is clear that Descartes did not share this

In his reply to Elizabeth's

reaction to the problem.

query he explains our inability to understand mind-body
interactions as follows:

2

The use of our senses has made the notions of extension,
shape and motion more familiar to us than the others;
and the main cause of our errors is that we commonly
want to use these notions to explain matters to which
(AT III 666; K 138)
they do not apply.

Descartes has the following picture in mind.

We

understand the world by means of certain elementary
notions - the notion of thought and its associated
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i

the notion of extension and its associated

a ttributes and the notion of mind-body unity.

Corresponding to each of these, God has established laws
which govern the realm of substances to which the notions
apply.

The laws of bodies in the case of extension, the

laws of minds in the case of thought and the laws of mind-

body unity in the case of that notion.

We fail to

understand mind-body interaction because we conceive it in
terms of the notions that apply to extension alone.

For

example, we wonder how a mind can "push on" the animal

spirits.

For Descartes, this is the wrong way of

conceiving mind-body interaction.
It is important to note that Descartes sees no more

difficulty in explaining mind-body interaction than in any
kind of interaction.

As we have seen,

in the case of

both body and mind, the explanation depends upon

identifying the essence of the substance in question,

identifying the laws that it observes and seeing what will
follow given initial conditions.

We do not explain,

for

example, how one body moves another by appealing to what

power makes it push the other, but rather we appeal to the

conditions under which they interact and the laws

governing this interaction.

Descartes can tell exactly

23
the same story with respect to mind-body interactions.

Another line of thought with respect to Descartes
possible commitment to a partial occasionalism has
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occurred more recently 24
.

The attribution is based on

Descartes' distinction between matter as essentially

passive and inert and thought as being essentially active.
Accordingly,

it would seem,

bodies,

cannot be causes of anything.

or body in general

There is no genuine causal

interaction between bodies nor do bodies cause changes in
the states of minds.

Minds,

on the other hand,

being

essentially active can and do cause changes in their own
modes as well as in the modes of bodies.
It seems to me that there is an important insight

here,

although to go so far as to attribute occasionalism

to Descartes with respect to bodily causation is surely

not justified.

What it means for a body to be inert is

that it cannot be the initiator of its own movements.

When asked by a correspondent whether matter left to
itself without impulse from outside would be in motion or
at rest,

Descartes replies

being at rest ". 25

"I

consider [it] as plainly

No body has the power of moving itself.

However, bodies in motion do have the power of changing
the condition of other bodies.

A body in motion is

conserved in motion by the action of God, but, as
Descartes has told us in The Wor Id

,

changes in its motion

are attributable to matter itself and its attributes.

When we direct our attention to minds, we see that
what is different in this case is that they are capable of

initiating new thoughts so to speak spontaneously.
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Volitions are not law governed in the way that motions are
(even though God is able to foresee them and to predict

what volition would occur given certain circumstances.)
So minds are able to initiate change in a way that matter
is not.

cause.

But that is not to say that matter is not a real

Significantly, even in the case of the initiation

of a new thought in a mind,

Descartes holds that such

causation is pre-conditioned by God, just as it is in the
case of matter's causing new motions in itself.
I

think it is fairly clear that Descartes did not

think of himself as in any sense an occasional ist, partial
or thoroughgoing.

The nearest he gets to affirming

something like occasionalism is in the letter to Elizabeth
of January 1646,

where he says that God arranges

circumstances so that objects present themselves to our
senses "on which occasion he knew that our freewill would

determine us to such or such an action" (AT III 667; K
189,
I

my emphasis).

As explained in the previous section,

believe that what is being affirmed here is that God

pre-conditions our actions without directly causing them.
This is not the view of a thoroughgoing occasional ist who

holds that, when objects are in the right relationship to
us,

God causes us directly to experience them and to form

whatever volitions we do in consequence.
However,

in Chapter III

I

will show that Malebranche

makes a very good case for the idea that God cannot be
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merely a pre-conditioning cause of natural phenomena.
depends upon the idea that,

It

if God has volitions

sufficient to bring about the entire world with all its
states, then that effect must come about directly and

without mediation as a result of God's volition.
Mai ebranche

'

s

argument is succesful

,

and

I

If

am right that

he is arguing from purely Cartesian principles,

then

Descartes must be an occasional i st in spite of himself.
C

.

Occasionalism Among the Cartesians

Among Descartes'

immediate followers, occasionalism

was a very popular position.

One can see,

in the works of

such Cartesians as Gerauld de Cordemoy, Louis de La Forge

and Arnold Geulincx,

9

A

much of the motivation that was to

lead Malebranche to elaborate his own causal position.

this section,

I

In

will discuss briefly the arguments that

led each of these to occasionalism,

and

I

will show that

none of these arguments is alone conclusive, although they
lay the foundation for the kind of strong argument for

occasionalism that Malebranche was to present in the
Dialogues

.

In the fifth part of his main philosophical work,

The

27 Cordemoy is concerned
Distinction Between Body and Soul
,

with the same question as that posed by Descartes in

article 36 of part II of the Principles
cause of motion?

.

What is the

Cordemoy notes, as an orthodox
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Cartesian, that motion cannot be part of the essence of a
body.

Obviously, any body could fail to be in motion, and

bodies are, by their nature,

inert.

a body to move must be external

So whatever causes

to it.

orthodox about the candidates also.

Cordemoy is
—

They are substances

other bodies, minds or God.
It is on the basis of another Cartesian principle

that bodies are excluded as possible candidates.

This

principle is captured in the phrase cessante causa, cessat

effectum (the cause having finished, the effect must
finish too).

As noted above (page 36),

Descartes employs

ths principle when he says "strictly speaking, the concept
of a cause is applicable only so long as it is having its

effect" (AT VII 108; CSM II 78).
in motion.

Consider some body,

b,

Whatever is the cause of the motion of b must

continue to cause b to move as long as b is in motion.
Therefore, the cause of motion in b cannot be some other

body imparting its motion to b on impact.

So when one

billiard ball strikes another and the second rolls accross
the table, the first one cannot be called the cause of the

motion of the second, since immediately on impact the
first stops doing anything, yet the effect (the motion in
the second) continues.

Cordemoy takes it to follow from this that no body
ever the cause of motion in another.

is

His reason for

rejecting finite minds as possible causes of motion is the
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.

.

standard one 29

How could two substances as radically

unlike as mind and body interact.

In order for mind-body

interaction there would have to be some common attribute

through which the interaction could work.
Since bodies cannot be causes of their own motion,
nor can other bodies be the cause, nor can finite minds,
the only remaining possibility is that God is the cause of

motion.

Cordemoy holds that this means that all effects

in the physical world are caused by God,

since all variety

in the physical world is explained in terms of different

motions of the parts of extension.

God must also be the

cause of sensations in finite minds, since these are

evidently not caused by the minds themselves, nor by
30
bodies, which, being inert, have no causal powers.

Significantly, Cordemoy does not exclude the possibility
that finite minds can be causes of some of their own
states.

Malebranche stretches his occasionalism even that

far

Although Cordemoy
Cartesian,

I

's

argument seems fundamentally

think there is no doubt that Descartes would

find much in it to which to object.

The primary fault

seems to lie in the application of the principle cessante
causa,
out,

Descartes, as has been pointed

cessat effectum.

undoubtedly believes in this principle, but, as has

also been pointed out, believes that among the states of

affairs requiring causes are changes of state.
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So,

on

Descartes' view, a substance's coming to have a certain

motion is something that requires

a cause.

Suppose some body b is at rest at time t and begins
to move at t x

.

Descartes says that the cause of its

beginning to move at t x is "nature itself" by which he
means bodily substance in general, perhaps acting through
the impact of some other part of extension.

As soon as

that impact has stopped it seems right to say that the
cause has ceased.

Body b continues in motion, but that is

not strictly speaking the effect of the impact.

That

effect is the coming- to be of the motion.

of

course,

stopped along with the impact.

That,

So,

for Descartes,

there is no problem with saying that bodies play some real
causal role in the production of motion.

No body is the

cause of b's being in motion, but matter in general is the
cause of its coming to be in motion.

There is surely also something suspicious about

Cordemoy's rejection of finite minds as causes of motion.
Surely God, as a spirit, does not share attributes with

extended substances.

It seems that Cordemoy is under no

less of a burden to explain how it is possible that God

acts on bodies than Descartes is to explain how it is

possible for minds.
respect to God.

Of course, there is an answer with

In God,

willing and acting are supposedly

the same thing, and it requires no more for God to produce
an effect than that he wills it.
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But if we are to accept

.

this as an explanation of God's ability to produce effects
in bodies,

then it requires some argumentation to show

that in the case of minds common attributes are required.

From Cordemoy we get none
When we turn to Louis de La Forge, what we find that
is missing in

Cordemoy is an argument that

is

intended to

block Descartes' move based on the distinction between the
cause of some state of affairs' existing and the cause of
its coming to be.

In the Treatise on the Soul of Man he

argues that no created substance can change the state of
any body.

He writes:

It is not only necessary that [God] continues to produce
[the body] if he wishes it to continue in existence, but
also, since he cannot produce it in every place nor in
no place at all, he must put it in place B, if that is
where he wants it.
(La Forge 240)

The argument is relatively straightforward.
to every mode that any body has,

that mode.

With respect

God must cause it to have

If God causes a substance to exist at a

certain time, he must cause it to exist in the location it
is

in at that time.

If,

at the next moment,

it has a new

location, he causes it to exist in the new location.

same could be said for the size,

substance has.

shape,

The

etc. that the

If God causes each substance’s existence

and causes it to have all the modes it has, what room is
What sense could be made of the

left for finite causes?

idea that a finite substance might cause another to change
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.

its state when what causes the new state is God?
if God causes s to be

Surely

in state a at t^ and to be in state

b at the next instant t2»

God has caused the change.

There is no additional state of affairs requiring to be

caused
It seems to me that there is much to be said for this

argument, and it is at the heart of Mai ebranche
VII argument.

In fact,

s

Dialogue

this seems to be the main ground

for rejecting Descartes'

distinction.

’

account of the primary/secondary

There seems to be no state of affairs that

God merely pre-conditions,

leaving room for some other

substance to be the direct and immediate cause.
as has already been pointed out,

However,

there is an alternative

Cartesian account of the primary/secondary distinction,
one that it seems to me Descartes does not adopt but could

have adopted.

This is a distinction based on a "strong-

liberal" interpretation of providence,

in which God is the

direct and immediate cause of everything requiring a
cause, but there is a sense of cause in which created

substances can be real causes of changes of states.

An

occasional ist must argue not only for the claim about God,
but against the claim about created substances.

It must

be shown that the "strong-liberal" account of providence
is untenable.

Malebranche,

La Forge does not take this latter step.
it seems to me,

31
matter of Chapter III
.
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does.

This is the subject

.
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CHAPTER III

OCCASIONALISM IN THE SEARCH AND DIALOGUES
Although the doctrine of occasionalism is evidently
and self-consciously adopted in the Search

,

and much of

the motivation for such a position explained there, a

thoroughgoing exposition of and argument for the theory
not developed until later.

In Elucidation XV,

1

is

in typical

Malebranchian style, what the philosopher regards as the
principal competitors are systematically rejected; in the

Treatise

,

clearly, a lot of the detail regarding God's

role is worked out and in the shorter Meditations

Chretiennes 2 of 1677 Malebranche begins to elaborate the
argument that is given its final form in Dialogue Seven.
It seems evident to me,

however, that it was not until the

searching examination of the details of the his view that

Arnauld provided in the Ref 1 exions

,

that Malebranche

applied himself to providing a sound and coherent
The fruit

philosophical justification for occasionalism.
of this application,

as with so much of Malebranche

mature thought, is to be found in the Dialogues
In the first part of this chapter,

I

'

.

will examine the

account of occasionalism given in the Search

,

looking

first at the motivations Malebranche gives for the theory
and then at the collection of arguments he presents in

Book VI, Part ii, Chapter
chapter,

I

will examine what
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In the second part of this

3.
I

take to be Malebranche

’

most serious argument for occasionalism, that which he
sustains throughout Dialogue VII of the Dialogues on

Metaphysics

.

A.

1

.

Occasionalism in the

S earch

The Mo tivation for Occasionalism
There is no doubt that, as an account of the

metaphysics of causal relations, occasionalism is

highly

a

unintuitive position to twentieth century philosophers.
One of the most valuable features of the account of causes

given in the Search at Book VI, Part

ii

is its

illumination of the motivation behind the view.

On the

one hand, Malebranche believes that all the serious

alternatives, but particularly positions that might be

described broadly as Aristotelian,

explanatory power.

lack any kind of

On the other, attributing causal

powers to natural entities is heretical.

Chapter Three of Part Two of Book Six of the Search
bears the title "The most dangerous error in the

philosophy of the ancients."

This error is the

explanation of natural effects by appeal to substantial
forms,

real qualities or natures in natural objects.

Malebranche points out the danger:

"if we assume,

in

accordance with their opinion, that bodies have certain
entities distinct from matter in them, then, having no

distinct idea of these entities, we may easily imagine
72

that they are the true or major causes of the effects we
see"

(OC II 311; LO 446).

3

Malebranche points out that postulation of such
entities primarily serves to explain these effects, having
in mind a widespread view of the nature of science as the

search for causes as explanations.

The rejection of this

view is an important part of the burden of the previous
chapter of Book VI, which is devoted to an examination of
the ways in which the established philosophical schools

reason by confused and indistinct ideas.

What such

reasoning amounts to is employing terms which have either
only a vague or equivocal meaning or no meaning at all.
One significant way in which this happens is in the

employment of the language of sensation.

Malebranche

claims that our sensory terms are, as he puts

it,

"equivocal" between referring to our sensations themselves
and referring to the qualities in objects that produce

these sensations.

Those philosophers who are not careful

to take notice of this equivocation, are apt to confuse

sensations with qualities that really exist in objects.
The other main employment of confused ideas occurs

when philosophers attempt to explain effects associated
with the actions of natural objects by appealing to powers
in those objects.

We have no clear idea of such powers:

Fire heats, dries, hardens and softens because it has
Senna purges
the faculty to produce these effects.
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because of its purgative quality; bread even nourishes,
if you will, through its nutritive quality: these
propositions are not subject to error... These or
similar ways of speaking are not false: it is just that
in effect they mean nothing.
These vague and
indeterminate ideas do not involve one in error, but
they are completely useless for discovering truth.
(OC
II 307: LO 444)
Our ideas of causal powers or faculties in natural

things are, Malebranche claims, a confusion of our
"general idea of cause" and the muddled ideas of effects
we experience (OC II 308; LO 445).

Our general idea of

cause is simply the idea of that between which and its

consequent there is a necessary connection. 4
the causal power of God,

for example,

is

Our idea of

just the idea of

the necessary connection between God’s volitions and the

obtaining of the states of affairs that he wills.

We

experience no necessary connection between the activities
of created individuals,

yet we experience certain effects

which we want to explain.

So we posit non-sensible

properties in the natures of things - causal powers or
faculties

-

which would establish the requisite connection

even though we do not experience it.

5

It is not hard to see what Ma 1 ebranche
is.

If we seek to explain certain effects,

'

s

objection

we learn

nothing by being told that these effects are the results
of the action of beings that have the power to cause them.
If we had a clear idea of such a power we might be able to

see how it had its effect, but since we do not have a
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.

clear idea we can learn nothing from the positing of such

powers
Mai ebranche points out that you can give "a million"

explanations of this kind, but that will not provide the
kind of knowledge that is really required

-

that which

enables us to predict what will occur in as yet

unexperienced cases.

He says "if you ask me to solve this

difficulty - namely, can fire harden mud and soften wax?

-

the ideas of substantial forms and faculties for producing

rarefaction and fluidity, and so on would be useless

heat,
to me"

(OC II 308; LO 444).

Our explanations of phenomena

that we experience must allow us to make judgements about
cases we do not experience.

Suppose that all our

explanations were of this kind: phenomenon p occurs in x
because agent a acts on x and has the power to produce

phenomenon p in

x.

Lacking a clear idea of how this power

produces its effect, we would never be able to predict
what would happen in the case when a acts on some other
individual

y,

where a's acting on y has not previously

been experienced.
But the postulation of causal powers or faculties in

natural objects is not just unexplanatory

.

Malebranche

describes it as a dangerous error:
If we consider attentively our idea of a cause or of a
power to act, we cannot doubt that this idea represents

something divine.... We therefore admit something divine
in all the bodies around us when we posit forms,
faculties, qualities, virtues, or real beings capable of
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:

producing certain effects through the force of their
nature.
(OC II 311; LO 446)

Malebranche thinks that allowing causal powers in natural
objects is tantamount to paganism.

We are no better when

we do this than those who adored the sun because of its

apparently universal power to sustain life.
he admits,

example,

It is true,

that we do not assign the same powers to,

leeks and onions as we do to the sun.

nonetheless,

6

But

in as much as we like them because they make

we are making little gods out of them.

us happy,

for

As soon

as we realize that there is no power in natural objects,
it becomes apparent that we owe all our adoration entirely

to God, which is,

of course,

in accordance with what the

faith dictates.
It is hard to know exactly what to make of this kind
It does seem to have a very important place

of argument.
in Mai ebranche

Search

,

'

s

thinking at the time of writing the

although no such argument appears in the

Dial ogues

.

of the fact

It is important to take note,

it seems to me,

that this is not a direct argument for

occasionalism, but rather a motivational argument.

Occasionalism had better be true or else we are in trouble
with respect to our faith.
I

think this point becomes evident when we see that

immediately following this argument Malebranche says the
foil owing
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In order that we shall no longer be able to doubt
the
falseness of this detestable philosophy and shall
clearly recognize the soundness of the principles and
the clearness of the ideas being used, it is necessary
clearly to establish the truths that are opposed to the
errors of the ancient philosopher, and to prove in a few
words that there is only one true cause because there is
only one true God; that the nature or power of each
thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural
causes are not true causes but only occasional causes,
and certain other truths that will follow from these/
(OC II 313; LO 448)

Clearly, Malebranche recognizes, then, that the argument

based on the heresy of attributing real powers to natural
objects does not "establish the truth" of these

propositions.

Malebranche, perhaps more than any other

major philosopher of this period,

freely mixed philosophy

and philosophical theology with religious dogma.

But he

knows the difference between an argument based entirely on
faith and one based on reason.

An argument whose whole

basis is that some doctrine must be false because it is

heretical does not "establish the truth" in the same way
as does one based on sound rational principles.
So we need not concern ourselves unduly with this

argument,

except to note that it does seem to be an

important consideration in seeing why a philosopher as

sophisticated as Malebranche would put forward a theory as

unintuitive as occasionalism.

As it will turn out,

the

argument that positing of natural causes is unexplanatory
plays a more important role in his thinking.
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2.

Four Arguments for Occasionalism
Having motivated his view about causality,

Mai ebranche has told us what it is that needs to be

established:

that God is the only true cause, that the

power in natural things is nothing other than the will of
and that natural agents are only the occasional

God,

causes of God's actions.
The arguments that follow in the Search are not the

most cohesive, appealing as they do to a variety of

unrelated principles.

They owe much to the kinds of

arguments discussed in the last section of Chapter
(i)

No motive force in bodies.

II.

The first argument

that Malebranche gives us has limited scope.

It concerns

the causes of movements in bodies.

large or

small," he tells us,

"No body,

"has the power to move itself."

Bodies are, by their nature,

inert.

"Since the idea that

we have of bodies makes it clear that they cannot move

themselves it is minds which move them" (OC
448)

II

313;

LO

.

In order to show that it cannot be finite minds that

move bodies, Malebranche appeals at this stage to a
limited application of a principle that he is soon to

apply more broadly.

It is this:

"a true cause.

.

.

is one

such that the mind perceives a necessary connection

between it and its effect" (OC

II

316;

LO 450).

But since

there is no necessary connection between the volition of a
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finite mind and the movement of any body, no finite
mind
can be the cause of such a movement.
It is not entirely clear what it is that Malebranche

takes this argument to establish.

He tells us,

having

pointed out that there is a necessary connection between
the will of God and the motions of bodies, that "the

motive force of bodies is therefore not in the bodies that
are moved,
of God"

for this force is nothing other than the will

(OC II 314; LO 448).

But he adds to this the

conclusion that "a natural cause is not a real cause".
If,

by the first part of this conclusion, he meant merely

to say that there is nothing in bodies beyond their

extension and its modes which gives them any causal
efficacy, that would seem at least validly concluded,

although surely question begging.

The argument depended

on the premise that bodies are essentially inert, which

surely presupposes that there is no motive force in them.
But Descartes, anyway,

seems to have believed that

there is causal efficacy in matter even though he held
that there is nothing in matter but extension.

So

Descartes believed that even though there may be nothing
in a body beyond the constitution of its extended parts,

there is sense to be made of the idea that the body may
exert some force.

That force is not an Aristotelian

tertium quid, but an attribute that allows causal efficacy
in matter nonetheless.
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Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

argument, deals with bodies as causes of

their own motion, and with minds as causes of the motion
of bodies.

But it does not deal with other (already

moving) bodies as possible causes of motion.

So that

although there may be no power of motion in a body itself,
nonetheless,

it appears to require a further argument to

show that this entails that bodies could not be causes of

motion in others.
Presumably, the assumption at work in the step from
"no motive force" to "no causal efficacy" is that a true

cause of motion can only act by imparting its own motive
force to that on which it acts, and no body has such a
force.

But the observation that "no body has the power to

move itself" can mean two things.

It can mean that no

body has the power to initiate motion in itself,

in which

case the possibility that a body already in motion has
some motive force is not excluded,

or it can mean that no

body has the power to sustain itself in motion.

In the

it remains to be established that a body

latter case,

sustained in motion by some external force does not

thereby gain a motive force of its own which it may impart
to whatever it interacts with.

This last seems to be

Descartes' view.
(ii)

has,

The

'Knowledge

'

as was pointed out,

is that the

argument.

This first argument

a limited scope.

Its conclusion

movements of bodies (and hence, for a
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Cartesian, all the behaviour of bodies) have as their only
"true

cause the will of God.

Malebranche suggests another

argument with the same scope

- the

attributed to Geulincx in Chapter

argument that was
II.

it is that a true

cause must know how to produce its effect.

In his

discussion of the implied divinity of natural beings with
causal powers, Malebranche entertains the idea that we may

avoid heresy by saying that although natural beings may
cause certain effects we can avoid treating them as little
gods on the grounds that they act without intelligence,

they "do not know what they are doing" (OC
446).

But,

he says,

II

310; LO

"who will believe that what produces

works that manifest a wisdom that surpasses all

philosophers produces them without intelligence?"
A little later,

Malebranche argues similarly with

respect to mental causation of physical effects:
How could we move our arms? To move them it is
necessary to have animal spirits, to send them through
certain nerves toward certain muscles in order to
inflate and contract them... And we see that men who do
not know they have spirits, nerves and muscles move
Therefore men will to move their arms and
their arms...
(OC II
and knows how to move them.
able
God
is
only
LO
450)
317;
The power to move a body depends on the knowledge of how

such movement can occur.

Neither bodies nor finite minds

have such knowledge, and so they cannot have the power.

Rather as in the case of the argument from heresy, it
is

hard to know what we should make of this argument.
81

If

s

knowledge of how to produce the effect is really part of
the concept of a true cause, then it is impossible to

avoid the strength of this argument.
say,

at least,

we,

concept.

But,

needless to

do not think that it is part of the

So perhaps this argument is best left aside.

There are certainly more interesting ones at hand.
(iii)

The

'Necessary Connection

'

argument.

The

principle that there must be a necessary connection

between a true cause and its effect is at work when

Malebranche turns his attention to the causes of the modes
O

The argument based on this principle has a

of minds.

more general conclusion.

Since there is no necessary

connection between any states of created substances there
can be no natural causal connections of any kind.

argument, too,

This

is not of the greatest interest in itself,

although it plays a role in what turns out to be
Mai ebranche

'

s

most important argument.

<

It is based on the

Cartesian principle that God must continually recreate the
world in order for it to stay in existence.

Q

There is

nothing about any created substance at a given time which
entails that that or any other substance will exist at the
next moment.

So there can be no necessary connection

between the states of created substances.
(iv)

No room for secondary causes.

Mai ebranche

'

last argument in the Search is a familiar one from La

Forge.

It is also at the core of his Dialogue Seven
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argument..

The argument depends on a principle that

Malebranche frequently appealed to and that was not
challenged among his Rationalist contemporaries:

willing and acting are the same thing. 10

in God,

As he puts it in

the Search "God needs no instruments in order to act:

it

suffices that He wills in order that a thing be" (OC II
316; LO 450).

affairs

Suppose that God wills a certain state of

and that some other supposed cause,

s,

say the

volition of an angel, is also present (it could equally
well be the volition of a man or the movement of some

object)

Malebranche asks us which of these two candidate

.

causes is truly efficacious.
is

We know that the will of God

necessarily efficacious, and that it has its effects

without media.

So the will of God must be the cause of

s,

and hence there is no room for the will of the angel to

have any causal role.
Clearly, this argument will only be valid if the

possibility of concurrence in the strict sense defined in
Chapter

I

According to that notion, God

is excluded.

concurs in some state of affairs

efficaciously wills that

s

s

if and only if he

obtains and some other

individual is a real causal agent in s's obtaining.
Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

attitude to the possibility of concurrence

both in this strict sense and in the weaker sense in which
God concurs in some state of affairs if and only if he

contributes part of what is required for that state of
83

1

.

affairs and creatures contribute the rest will be

discussed in the final part of this chapter and again in
Chapter VI

1

B.

The Argument in Dialogue Seven

Commentators on Mai ebranche

'

theory of causality

s

have represented him as employing a battery of distinct

arguments in favour of his position. 12

This is certainly

the impression one receives from the account in the

Search
I

.

must say at the outset that

I

believe this rough

partitioning of the arguments, valuable though it

is,

fails to give a completely satisfactory account of
Mai ebranche

'

s

best efforts on this matter.

It is my

contention that Dialogue VII of the Dialogues on
Metaphysics consists in a single sustained and very

complex argument for each component of a most

sophisticated version of occasionalism.

The last part of

this chapter will be devoted to a careful scrutiny of this

argument in its entirety.
Occasionalism,

in Mai ebranche

with three components

- a

'

s

hands,

is a theory

positive component concerning

divine or primary causal activity, a negative component

concerning natural or secondary causal activity, and an

explanatory component concerning the appearance of natural
causal activity.

The Dialogues on Metaphysics is the best
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source for separate treatments of each component in the

context of a discussion of mind-body interaction.

The

argument of Dialogue VII establishes first the positive
component and then the negative component.

The central

details of the explanatory component emerge during the
course of this argument.
As has already been pointed out,

occasionalism is a

general theory of causality, a theory meant to account for
the extent and nature of God's causal activity and of that

created entities. 15

of all

Nevertheless, the argument for

occasionalism that appears in the Dialogues

is

introduced

into the context of the possibility of mind-body

interaction.

Ariste, the interlocutor of the Dialogues

who represents a kind of naive Cartesian, 15 has started
out Dialogue VII by claiming that "there is nothing to

which
153;

I

am more closely united than my own body" (OC XII

D 145).

Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

mouthpiece, Theodore, responds

that the mind "can only be united to that on which it can
act"

(OC XII 154; D 147).

When Ariste is challenged as to

whether this is possible he is forced to admit "there is
something that

I

do not completely understand.

it all take place?"

(OC XII 154; D 147).

How does

This sounds not

unlike" the worry of Princess Elizabeth and of Arnauld

concerning mind-body interaction on the Cartesian model:
how can two substances as unlike as mind and body

interact 16
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7

Mai ebranche does not seem to regard this
problem as
in itself sufficient to show the truth of
mind-body

occasionalism.

The argument that follows is intended to

show that interaction between mind and body is impossible

because interactions between any created substances are
impossible - that is, because occasionalism as a general

theory of causality is true.
What

Malebranche
A:

am calling the positive component of

I

'

s

occasionalism can be formulated thus:

For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then God is a real causal agent in
c's being in s at t.
On Mai ebranche

'

s

view, an entity can only count as a

real causal agent in some state of affairs if it

contributes to the bringing about of that state of affairs
by the exercise of some real causal power.

As has been

pointed out above, his a idea of a genuine causal power

is

one of a necessary connection.
Mai ebranche

'

s

argument for Thesis A is this.

created substances are created by God.

All

It is a

contradiction to say that a substance might be created
without being created in some determinate state.

1

Let us

say that a state of a created substance c at a time t is

the set of all the modes had by

state of a created substance

c

c at t.

at a time at which it is

created by God a creation state of
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We shall call the

c.

Whatever God brings

.

about,

he brings about only by his volitions.

Since his

volitions are exercises of real causal power, God is

a

real causal agent in every creation state of every

substance.

Since God must create a substance in some

determinate state,

i.e.

with a complete set of modes, he

must be a causal agent not only in the existence of a

substance at the time of its creation, but also in its

having all the modes it has at that time.
Now,

call any state of a created substance c after

its initial creation state a post-creation state of

any state of
a

c

c,

and

in which c is conserved in existence by God

conservation state of

c.

Malebranche argues as follows:

Should God no longer will that there is a world; the
world is thereby annihilated.
For assuredly the world
depends on the volitions of the creator.
If the world
subsists, that is because God wills that it continues
to exist.
On the part of God, the conservation of
creatures is nothing but their continued creation.
Conservation and creation are simply a single volition
which, consequently, is necessarily followed by the same
effects (OC XII 156-7; D 152,3).
.

This passage bears a great burden for Malebranche.

It

contains not only the premise necessary for the completion
of the argument for Thesis A,

but also the basis of an

argument for the negative thesis.
Cartesianism.

First of all,

It is all

orthodox

it is clear that Malebranche

believes God's will to be a necessary condition for the

existence of any created being.

So every post-creation

state is also a conservation state.
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But the conservation

.

:

of created substances is simply "their
continued

creation".

So,

every 'conservation state is also a

creation state.

Hence,

creation state.

Since God is a real causal agent in every

every post-creation state is a

creation state of every created substance,

it follows that

God is a real causal agent in every state of every

substance.

That is Thesis A.

It might be thought that Malebranche is all the way

to occasionalism already.

God creates every state of

every state of every substance.

However, he himself

clearly felt the need for further argument in order to

establish his negative thesis concerning natural

causation
B:

For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then there is no created substance c'
such that c’ is a real causal agent in c's being in s
at t.

Malebranche must have been conscious of the prevalent
philosophical orthodoxy with respect to causation,

according to which Thesis A is true but not incompatible
with natural causal activity.
theism.

That is the doctrine of

God concurs with created agents in bringing about

natural states of affairs.

Thesis B effectively denies

the possibility of concurrence between divine and human

agents
Thesis A may be read in two ways.

To see this it

will be helpful to review some of the terminology from
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Chapter
s

God efficaciously wills that state of affairs

I.

obtains if and only if God wills that

God's willing that

s

s

obtains and

obtains is a direct cause of s's

obtaining. God pre-conditions a state of affairs

s

only if God efficaciously wills that circumstances

obtain and knows that if

c

obtain then

about by some independent cause.

affairs

s

s

if and
c

will be brought

God concurs in state of

if and only if God efficaciously wills that s

obtains and some other agent a is a direct causal agent in
s's obtaining.

God fully efficaciously wills that state

of affairs s obtains if and only if God efficaciously

wills that

s

obtains but does not concur in

s.

God's pre-conditioning any state of affairs is

precluded for Malebranche by the fact that the means of
God's causal agency is always his efficacious will.

Since

God is a real causal agent in every state of every
substance, he efficaciously wills every state of every

substance.

However, the causal agency of Thesis A could

yet be either concurrence or fully efficacious willing.

Malebranche must establish the latter if he

is to

establish occasionalism.
I

believe that the passage from section vii of

Dialogue VII (OC XII 156-7; D 152,3) quoted above contains
an essential premise of Mai ebranche
B.

'

s

argument for Thesis

God's willing that some created substance

certain state

s

c be

in a

is a necessary condition for c's being in
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.

Granted that God's volition that

s.

c

be in

s

is not a

necessary condition for any other state of any substance,
c

included, 18 it follows that no state of affairs other

than God

s

willing it can be a sufficient condition for

c's being in

Now Malebranche held that a cause is

s.

always a sufficient condition for its effect

(I

take this

to be the force of his claim that a real cause is that

"between which and its effect the mind perceives

necessary connection" (OC

II

316;

LO 450).)

a

Since no

created substance or state thereof is a sufficient

condition for any state of any substance, no created
substance is a real cause of any state of any substance.
That is thesis

B,

and it is my claim that Malebranche

arrives at this thesis without employing any non-Cartesian
premises

After Malebranche has defended a version of this

argument against the worries of his interlocutor in
Dialogue VII, he summarizes in this way:
It is this that needs to be explained in order to make
reason agree with experience... God communicates his
power to creatures and unites them among themselves only
in the sense that he establishes their modalities as
occasional causes of the effects which he produces
himself; occasional causes, I say, which determine the
efficacy of his volitions, in consequence of the natural
laws that he has prescribed for himself... (OC XII 1601;

D 158,9)

Experience teaches us that there is a constant and orderly

connection between states of affairs in the natural world.
90

As Ariste has put it in the same Dialogue,

"one says only

what one knows whenever one proposes that bodies act on
spirits... Experience does not permit one to doubt this"
(OC X 150—1;

D 146-8,

149).

This appearance of natural

causal interaction needs to be explained given the denial

that this is real causation.

The exact details of this

appearance-saving component are spread throughout
Mai ebranche

'

s

work,

the next chapter.

and some of them will be examined in
The essential feature is that what

explains the appearance of causal activity among creatures
is the

regularity of God's action.

Whenever circumstances

are repeated the consequences are repeated.

affairs in the world are related by laws.

States of

Malebranche

tells us that the laws of nature are merely God's general

volitions and that these volitons are directed towards

particular effects by antecedent conditions.

Occasional

causes "determine the effects" of God's volitions.
I

believe that essentially he held to something like

this thesis:

C:

For every pair of created substances c and c', state
is an occasional causal agent in c's
s and time t, c
being in s at t if and only if
(a) c is in s at t, and
(b) there is a state s' and a relation R and a time
t' such that
(i) t is not prior to t'
(ii) s' is a state of c' at t'
(iii) c' stands in R to c
(iv) there is a natural law that implies that if
c' is in s' at t' and stands in R to c,
then c is in s at t.
'
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Exactly what this thesis involves is central to the debate

between Malebranche and Arnauld.

Arnauld held that if

God's volitons are all of them general and require to be

directed toward their effect by particular occasional
causes, then two consequences follow.
is

imperfect,

First,

God's action

like that of a prince or a bishop who makes

general decrees but does not control their particular

execution and effects; and second, occasional causes must
have some efficacy,

i.e.

they must be real causes.

objections, and other issues from the debate will be

discussed in Chapter IV.
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Notes
1*

The third edition of the Search published in 1677-8,
contained for the first time a set of elucidations
written by Malebranche in response to sundry informal
criticisms he had solicited. These are found in Volume
III of the Oeuvres Completes de Malebranche as well as
in the English translation by Lennon and Olscamp.
,

2.

OC volume

3.

Although he never says so explicitly, I think it is
clear that Malebranche thinks of a cause as something
exercising a genuine power. This probably seemed so
obvious to him that it was not worth remarking. The
passage quoted from Search VI, ii, 3 continues "if we
consider our idea of a cause or power to act..." (OC II
LO 446)
311

X,

especially Meditation

V.

;

4.

See OC II 315; LO 450.

5.

The first misuse seems relevant here.
We experience
certain sensations on the occasion of perceiving
objects and we are apt to explain these sensations by
positing qualities in them which cause our sensations
and which our sensations exactly resemble.
It is
interesting to note that at the time Malebranche was
writing the Search Locke was formulating his view
according to which we are apt to confuse our sensations
with the qualities in objects which they represent.
There is no reason to suppose that there is anything in
bodies corresponding to our sensations of them.
Nonetheless, Locke was committed to the idea that our
sensations are caused by powers in the objects.
,

6.

The reference to leeks and onions
OC II 312; LO 447.
is to a story in Exodus.

7.

See Chapter II, page 50.

8.

OC II 315; LO 449.

9.

See Chapter II, pages 43-6; LO 223.
for example, OA XXXIX 190.

10.

See,

11.

For an interesting introduction to this issue see R. C.
Sleigh Jr. "Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality" in J.
Central Themes in Early
A. Cover and Mark Kulstad, eds
Modern Phi losoph y (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991).
.
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See,
II),

12.

for example, Daisie Radner Ma 1 ebranc he (Chapter
Steven M. Nadler "Occasionalism and the Mind-Body
Problem and Charles McCracken Malebranche and Modern
British Philosophy (Chapter 3).

13.

See Chapter

14.

This is in contrast to the claim of Steven M. Nadler in
"Occasionalism and the Mind-Body Problem" in which he
says "It is significant for my thesis if Malebranche,
perhaps the most important and well known of the
occasional ists did not present his occasionalism in
response to the mind-body problem either in whole or in
part.
In fact, close examination of the relevant texts
reveals that none of the arguments Malebranche offers
for denying real mind-body interaction... exhibits a
concern for the special conceptual problem." The
conceptual problem referred to is that of the
conceivabi 1 ity of two substances as radically different
as mind and body acting on oneanother.
As I pointed
out in Chapter I, I believe that Nadler' s essential
thesis in this paper is correct, that occasionalism in
Ma 1 ebranche s hands is a general theory of causality
and not just a theory of mind-body interaction, but it
is certainly not to be overlooked that the argument of
Dialogue VII appears in the context of just this
conceptual concern.
Surely it must be construed as
showing "a special concern for the conceptual problem."

note

I,

1.

,

'

15.

In addition to representing a naive Cartesian, Ariste
also sometimes plays the role of the scholastic,
sometimes of the acute layman, and, most often, of the
Renaissance playboy.

16.

See Chapter II,

17.

A substance's modes are
This is good Cartesianism
Since a
simply the way in which that substance exists.
created,
it
when
it
is
exist
in
some
way
must
substance
modes.
of
determinate
set
some
created
with
must be

18.

Malebranche holds that there is no necessary connection
between one state of a substance and another state of
We may regard a state
that substance for this reason.
Since God could cease to
as a kind of temporal slice.
maintain his conservation of the world at any time,
nothing can follow necessarily about future states of a
substance from the fact that it is in a given state at
The case is not so straightforward in
a given time.
the case of no necessary connections between states of
distinct substances. Malebranche, being a good

section B3
.
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Cartesian, regards motion as irreducibly relational.
So if we are to say that part of the state of substance
c at a certain time is that it has a certain motion, it
is hard to see how this can fail to be necessarily
dependent on certain other substances being in the
relevant states.
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CHAPTER IV
DIVINE AND NATURAL ACTIVITY

Having seen how Malebranche argues for the general
theses of occasionalism and what those theses amount to,
it is time to examine some of the particular points of

detail dealt with in the Treatise

and Grace

,

as its title suggests,

The Treatise on Nature

.

is devoted to an

examination of the way in which God acts both in the realm
of nature and in the realm of grace.

The latter area is

immensely complex.

It is often very hard to keep a fast

eye on the issues.

Fortunately,

for the purposes of this

dissertation, a close examination of Mai ebranche

'

doctrine on grace and freedom and of Arnauld's criticisms
of it is not essential

.

The reward

examination of Mai ebranche

'

s

I

hope to reap from an

debate with Arnauld is a

clearer understanding of the relationship between
Mai ebranche

s

'

occasionalism and Leibniz' theory of

concomitance or pre-established harmony.

This end can be

attained by concentrating on the what Malebranche and

Arnauld have to say about God's activity in the realm of
nature
In this chapter,

I

will devote my attention to two

questions concerning the details of agency according to
occasionalism, each of which much exercised Arnauld.

The

first concerns element A in my presentation of
Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

theory

-

that God is the total real cause of
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every state of every being.

s

How is God's causal activity

to be understood with respect to the effects that he

produces?

A satisfactory answer to this question is

central to Mai ebranche

Treatise

.

'

s

theodicean purposes in the

The second question concerns the role of

occasional causes.

In what sense is it said that they

"determine the efficacy" of God's will?

Arnauld devotes

the whole of the first book of the Reflexions to attacking
Mai ebranche

'

s

answers to these two questions.
A.

The Nature of Divine Action

We may call Thesis A of the account of occasionalism

presented in Chapter III Mai ebranche

'

positive doctrine.

s

In the first discourse of the Treatise

Mai ebranche

,

'

principal aim is to expand on this doctrine by explaining
the way in which God acts in the conduct of the world. The

products of this are the derivation of the two fundamental
laws of physics - the law of the conservation of motion

and the law of distribution of motion on the occasion of

impact 1 - and an answer to the problem of evil.

It is

primarily this latter problem that motivates Mai ebranche
view of God's activity in the Treatise
The details of Mai ebranche

'

s

'

.

account depend on the

distinction between general and particular volitions.
Malebranche claimed that in the ordinary course of nature
God only ever acts by general volitions.
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This seems to be

.

1

the claim that Arnauld found more distressing
than any

other in the Tr eatise

.

A glance at the chapter headings

reveals that almost all of Book

devoted to refuting this.

I

of the Reflexion s is

In this section,

to what is involved in the distinction,

Arnauld fully grasped

I

shall attend

to whether or not

and to the extent to which

it,

Malebranche was able to deal with Arnauld's criticsms.
In part

1,

shall introduce Mai ebranche

I

'

treatment of

s

the problem of evil in the first discourse of the
>

ib part 2,

to Malebranche

'

s

I

shall explain Arnauld's objection

account, and elucidate the distinction

between God's general and particular volitions; in part

3,

shall discuss a defence of Malebranche suggested in a

I

paper by Steven

M.

Nadler, based on the claim that Arnauld

misunderstood Malebranche

'

s

account of God's action, and

I

shall argue that Arnauld did not misunderstand
Mai ebranche

'

s

occasionalism, and that his objection stands

in need of rebuttal

1

.

The Problem of Evi
First, we should turn to the Treatise itself, and to

Malebranche

'

s

treatment of the problem of evil.

one of the first discourse of the Treatise

,

In part

Malebranche is

concerned to explicate the nature of God's activity in the
realm of nature.
What constitutes perfection in action?

Malebranche

believes that there are two potentially conflicting
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measures of goodness in action, which are goodness of
effects and goodness of means.

In article XII,

he tells

us "the wisdom of God uncovers to him an infinity of ideas
of possible works and all the possible ways of executing

these designs" (OC V 27).

What Malebranche calls

variously the effects, works
(

desseins

)

(

ouvrages

)

or designs

have their own measure of goodness.

richness, variety and abundance.

2

It is

Meanwhile, the means

that an agent employs have their goodness measured in

terms of their simplicity and their fertility

(

fecondite ):

An excellent workman must proportion his action to his
work; he does not do in very complicated ways what he
could execute more simply.... God, discovering in the
infinite vaults of his wisdom an infinity of possible
worlds, as the necessary consequences of the laws of
movements that he could establish, was determined to
create that which could be produced and conserved by the
most simple laws.
(OC V 28)
For Malebranche, as for most of his contemporaries, the

means of God's action is always his efficacious will.

We

are told in article XII to pay attention that "God has no

need of instruments in order to act; his volitions are

necessarily efficacious" (OC V 27).

2

So,

in God,

simplicity of means cannot be a matter of economy of
effort or simplicity of instruments.

Rather,

it must be

in terms of two things - the number of volitions and the

simplicity of their content.

A state of affairs is

brought about by the simplest means, for God, just in case

99

n

it is brought about by the fewest volitions with
the

simplest (presumably propositional) content, or else by
some balance of these.

With respect to the

end.

or

dies s & i

of God

1

s

action,

he informs us in article XIV that "God could have made a

world more perfect than that which we inhabit" (OC V 29).
For example,

he could have made the rain always fall on

fertile ground, or never caused a child to be born with

monstrous limbs.

Malebranche seems to believe that these

things could have been achieved at no cost in the rest of
the work.

The world, measured in terms of effects,

have been a better place.

nevertheless,

could

Malebranche believes,

that he can "justify the wisdom and bounty

of God in spite of the irregularities of nature,

the

monsters, the sin and miseries to which we are subject"
(OC V 28-9).

How is this possible?

The answer is relatively straightforward.

Since

perfection of action is measured both in terms of means
and of ends, the most perfect agent must act with these in

balance.

At the very start of the Treatise

,

in article

I,

Malebranche establishes that God only acts for his own
glory.

In the addition to article XIII,

consequence:

he draws this

"God wants his ways to be the most wise, as

well as his designs.

He does not want the designs to

honour him while the ways dishonour him" (OC V 28).
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As a

.

result, he must choose the combination of designs and ways

that "together most bear the character of his attributes".
The goodness of divine action is not determined by
the happiness it brings to humans.

God did not create the

world for us, according to Ma 1 ebranche

4

Rather, God's

perfection in action is found in his acting in a way that
best reflects and glorifies his own attributes, among

which simplicity is of the greatest significance.

If God

had chosen a world (i.e. a design) more perfect, he would

have had to act with less perfect simplicity.

"He would

have had to multiply the laws of the communication of

movements by which our world subsists; and hence there
would no longer have been between the action of God and
his work that proportion which is essential in an

infinitely perfect being" (OC V 29).

Malebranche identifies the laws of nature with God's
general volitions.

He has already established the

commonly accepted truth that God has no need of
instruments with which to act.

acting are the same thing.

For God, willing and

Yet he tells us that the laws

of motion are "the cause of all the movements which

produce that variety of forms that we admire in nature"
(OC V 30),

and that reflection on the simplicity and

fertility of them makes it clear that they have been

chosen by an agent capable of producing "an infinity of
marvels by a very small number of volitions" (OC V 31).
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In the addition to article XIX he comes right
out with the

following claim:

"the general cause acts always by general

volitions or laws" (OC V 32).

Clearly,

for Malebranche,

to act by a general volition is the same thing as to act
by a general

law.

In the ensuing parts of this section,

I

shall consider Arnauld's most often repeated criticism of

Malebranche

'

account of God's action

s

-

that God does not

act always in the course of nature by general volitions.
2

.

General and Particular Volitions
In Book

I

of the Ref 1 exions Phi 1 osophiques et

Theo logiques sur le Nouveau Systeme de la Nature et de la

Grace

,

Arnauld carries on a sustained campaign against

Malebrache's claim that,

in the ordinary course of nature,

God acts only by general volitions.

His objections are

all of them based on the supposition that Malebranche has

misrepresented what it is to act by general volitions:
He takes for the same thing to act by general volitions
and to act according to general laws.
However, this is
just what must not be confounded, the latter being very
different from the former, to speak exactly, as he
professes to do.
Because the laws are the order
according to which things are done, and the volitions
are (above all in God) that by which things are done.
(OA XXXIX 175, emphasis in text.)

On Arnauld's view,

it is quite right to say that God,

the most part, acts in accordance with general laws.
the result of Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

for

But

equivocation is that he is led

to thinking that it is by the laws that God always acts.
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For a variety of reasons, according to Arnauld, this is

unacceptable, and it is against this notion, that the laws
are God's volitions and the means by which he brings about

particular effects, that he is arguing.
(i)

Particular causes for particular effects.

The

first reason Arnauld gives against God's acting by general

volitions is that "everything that happens, happens in
particular, and never in general.
being,

in God,

the same thing,

by a particular action,

Now,

willing and acting

since he creates each soul

it must be that he wills also to

create it by a particular volition" (OA XXXIX 175).

argument depends on the following idea.

This

A particular

effect must have a particular cause, the cause of that
effect.
s,

The existence,

for example,

of a particular soul

must be the effect of a particular action, the creation
Since the act of the creation of

of s.

God,

s

is a volition of

that volition must itself be particular

volition to create

the

s.

This first argument is more serious,
seems.

-

I

think,

than it

It appears to be open to the rather obvious

objection that, as Malebranche points out, there is no
serious difficulty with the view that one cause can have
more than one effect.

God's general volitions may have an

infinity of particular effects.

But

I

believe that

Arnauld has a siginifcant point to make.
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Let's take another example, since an occasion of
creation,

if that is taken to mean the initial

the creation of some substance,
view,

is not,

in Mai ebranche

part of the ordinary course of nature.

there is some created substance
have mode F at time t.

c

'

s

'

Suppose that

such that

On Mai ebranche

instant of

comes to

c

view, the cause

of c's coming to have F at t is a general volition of God,

by which Arnauld takes Malebranche to mean a law of

nature.

Consider the following two volition contents:

A:

Let

B:

For all created substances x and y and every time tj,
if x is G at t-^ and bears relation R to y then there
is a time t 2 such that y is F at t
2

c be

F at t

.

Arnauld interprets Malebranche as claiming that all of
God's volitions in the ordinary course of nature are of
The proposition

the form of B.

'c

is F at t'

follows

necessarily from God's having a volition of form
not from his having a volition of form

A,

but

Only some

B.

particular conditions in association with B will bring
about c’s being F at
God is,

in fact,

Now,

t.

Mai ebranche

'

s

view is that

responsible for bringing it about that

the appropriate antecedent conditions hold.

But now we may see the thrust of Arnauld'

argument.

If God brings

s

first

it about that antecedent

conditions combine with his general will to procure the
outcome that

c

is F at t,
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does he will that

c

is F at t or

.

not?
c

s

Surely, God brings this about because he has chosen

being F at t as being among the most preferred states

of affairs.

But if that is so,

he has a volition of form A,
a

isn't it equally sure that

which,

as was pointed out,

is

particular volition sufficient for its particular

effect.

According to Arnauld, the true picture must be

that God has a particular volition for each state of

affairs
that

s

s

in the world,

obtains".

a

volition of the form "let it be

In the ordinary course of nature,

these

states of affairs will be in accordance with general laws,

although that is not to say that those laws will be the
cause of the states of affairs.

exactly," he summarizes,

"All one can say

"is that God acts by particular

volitions in consequence of general laws; which is far
from being able to say, what the author says on every
page,

that the universal cause never acts at all by

particular volitions " (OA XXXIX 175, emphasis in
original

)

(ii)

Arnauld argues

Two senses of 'general cause'.

that the expression 'general cause'

is equivocal,

and that

one sense appropriately describes the nature of God's

action while the other most certainly does not.
article v of Chapter

I

of the Reflexions

,

5

In

he argues that

someone committed to the view that God never acts (at
least in the ordinary course of nature) by particular
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,

volitions is thereby committed to the view that the
inadequate concept of a general cause applies to God.
In the first sense,

a general

cause is an agent that

only has a concern for the general, as is the case with a
king "who governs his kingdom by general orders, but who

cannot himself ordinarily see to it that they are well
executed;

like a bishop who has a general care for his

diocese, but who cannot, by himself, attend to each soul
in particular"

(OA XXXIX 178).

The other sense is that of

an agent who has a particular and immediate care for

everything.

In this sense,

the generality comes from the

scope of the agent's activity.

It extends to everything,

whereas in the former sense, the generality was a matter
of the mode of activity.

Arnauld points out that an agent that only ever acts
by general volitions can only be called a "general cause"
in the first sense.
F at time t.

Suppose that substance

c

has property

If God does not have a particular volition

'let c be F at t

'

then God cannot be said to have a

particular care for the state of

c.

That substance's

being F at t must be an unforeseen and unwilled

consequence of more general volitions that God has without
regard to their consequences.

If on the other hand,

he

has the general volitons he has because he wishes to bring

about particular effects, then he must antecedently have
had the relevant particular volitions,
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for example "let

c

F at t

.

And such volitions are, of course,

necessarily efficacious.
i

cu 1 ar volitions,

In short,

if God never acts by

then particular consequences such as

c's being F at t cannot be among the choices he makes.

He

must be like the king who forms laws with no regard to

particular instances.
(iii)

This is surely unworthy of God.

Simplicity of ways.

Arnauld presses this last

point home in article vii of Chapter

I,

in which he draws

a distinction between two ways in which the simplicity of

divine action can be understood,
us,

one of which, he tells

accurate "but completely useless for the intentions

is

of the author"

(OA XXXIX 180),

the other of which has no

truth in it at all.
In article vi

,

Arnauld has pointed out that

Malebranche takes for the same thing acting by general
volitions, acting by general laws and acting by simple
means.

6

For Malebranche, God must,

in creating the world,

balance simplicity of means against richness and diversity
of effects.

The picture that Arnauld finds no truth in,

is that

in which God's choice at creation is simply one of

means.

God chooses to produce whatever world comes about

by those laws which are very simple yet at the same time

very fertile, fertile enough to produce "an infinity of

marvels by a very small number of volitions" (OC V 31).
Obviously, what is wrong with this picture is that,
is

if God

only choosing laws, he seems to have no regard or care
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for particular effects,

only that, whatever those effects

may be, they should be rich, abundant and varied.
The alternative picture is that according to which

God "acts by the simplest means in accordance with his

designs

(OA XXXIX 180,

my emphasis)

.

According to this

picture, God chooses the world that he desires and

considers the simplest means of achieving it.

Arnauld

recognizes that Malebranche seems to have something like
this in mind in article xii of the Treatise wherein he
says:

"the wisdom of God uncovers to him an infinity of

possible works and the possible ways of executing his
designs"

(OC V 27).

But he points out that this is not

compatible with the view that God always acts by general
volitions.

first action is to survey and choose

including all its substances and all its temporal

a world,

states,

If God's

he must,

in so choosing,

have particular volitions

for each of those states.

The fact that neither of these picturs perfectly

represents Malebranche
argument.
view,

'

s

account does not hinder Arnauld'

As has been pointed out,

God,

in Mai ebranche

'

does not choose the best possible design, and then

look for the best means to bring that design about.

In

order to balance perfection of means and ends, he is

constrained to choose a design that is less perfect than
the best.

But whatever happens, either he chooses this

design in all its detail or it comes about so to speak by
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accident as a result of the means he chooses,

objection is that,
volitions,

'

if God always acts by general

it must be the

All of Arnauld

Arnauld

'

s

latter.

criticisms of Mai ebranche

'

s

view

that God only acts by general volitions seem to hinge

around the following idea.

If God does not have a

particular volition with respect to each state of affairs,
then he cannot have chosen each state of affairs.
God,

to choose is to have a volition.

of affairs s,

For

If he chooses state

he does this by willing "let it be that s".

Similarly,

if he does not will

not chosen

s.

"let it be that s" he has

This is contrary to Providence.

On the other hand,

if,

as Arnauld thinks he must,

Malebranche is required to admit a particular volition for
every state of affairs, then Mai ebranche

'

s

avoiding the problem of evil is undermined.

strategy for

Malebranche

was able to sustain the compatibility of evil with God's

justice by saying that he does not have a particular

volition for particular evils.

7

It has been argued elsewhere that Arnauld simply

misunderstood Mai ebranche
general volition.

'

s

conception of acting by

In the next part of this section,

I

shall consider that argument.

3

.

Nadler

*

s

Defence of Malebranche

There is some question about the correct way to

interpret Malebranche on the issue of God's action in the
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world.

Traditionally, his view has been understood to

involve that God is constantly and actively engaged in the

moment to moment progress of the world, that is to say
that he always acts by what Arnauld understands as

particular volitions.
for this.

There is a very reasonable basis

In what was described in Chapter III as his

best argument for the occasional ist position, Malebranche

establishes his view that God's conservation of the world
is

in principle indistinguishable from his creation of it.

Malebranche uses this point to establish that at each
moment God effectively "recreates" each substance with all
its modes.

Steven Nadler has recently argued that this

shows that "Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

God must be directly and

immediately responsible for each and every particular
effect in nature; that is that God's activity as efficient
cause must be constant, ubiquitous and necessary."

O
I

think this is the position that Leibniz considers unworthy
of God in the correspondence with Arnauld (see Chapter V),

and also the one that Arnauld says is not implied by

occasionalism in a letter to Leibniz of March 4th 1687.
Nadler recognizes Arnauld'
itional" reading.

s

divergence from the "trad-

His paper is intended to defend the

"traditional" reading against Arnauld

's

interpretation.

The dispute over the correct interpretation arises

with respect to whether God's acting in accordance with
natural

laws means his engaging in,
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as Nadler would have

:

it,

"an infinite number of discrete temporalized acts"

each in accordance with the laws of nature,

or means

simply willing the laws of nature (and presumably the
initial state of the world) and thereby, and with no

further volitions, producing the world in its temporal
entirety.

This latter interpretation is Arnauld's and is

more in keeping, apparently, with the idea that God always
acts by general volitions.

Unfortunately, Mai ebranche is very equivocal on this
point in the Treatise

On the one hand, he says that the

.

laws themselves are "so simple,

so natural,

yet at the

same time so fertile" that God is able to "work an

infinity of marvels with a very small number of volitions"
(art.

xvii, OC V 31), and he talks about certain events

being the "necessary consequences" of the laws and the
laws "producing" certain effects,

all of which strongly

suggests that he has in mind the latter of the two

interpretations in mind.

On the other hand,

in the First

Elucidation added to later editions of the Treatise

g
,

he

writes
say that God acts by general volitions, whenever he
I
acts in consequence of the general laws that he has
For example, I say that God acts in me by
established.
general volition, when he makes me feel pain on the
occasion of my being pricked; because according to the
general and efficacious laws of the union of the soul
and body, he makes me suffer pain whenever my body is
indisposed. (OC V 147)
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Nadi er reads this passage as suggesting that, at the
time

when

I

am pricked, God then and there makes me feel pain

in order that his actions remain in accord with the laws
of union of mind and body

Any other action he chose (my

.

being annihilated or my feeling no pain) would be
irregular and hence unworthy of him.
So on the one hand,

Arnauld has argued that

Malebranche conflates acting by general volitions with
acting by general laws, when in fact all that can be said
of God’s action is that he acts according to general

laws.

On the other hand, Nadler has argued that Arnauld has

misinterpreted what it

on Mai ebranche

is,

to act by general volitions.

On Nadler'

s

'

s

view,

for God

account, we need

to distinguish between acting by a general volition and

bringing something about with a general volition. 10

The

former means simply to act in accordance with general laws
even though each effect is brought about with a distinct

particular volition.
Whatever the status of the position taken in the
Treatise and its subsequent amendments, the Dialogues seem
to lend themselves unequivocally to Arnauld’

interpretation.
Theodore,

In Dialogue VI,

Mai ebranche

'

s

spokesman,

says that the laws of the union of body and soul

are "nothing but the constant and efficacious volitions of
the creator"

(D 132,3).

In Dialogue XI,
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he says:

At the time of creation, God constructed animals and
plants for future centuries. He established laws of
motion necessary for making them grow. Now he is at
rest because he does no more than follow these laws...
Everything is done in relation to the laws of motion,
laws which are so simple and so natural that, although
God does everything by means of them in the ordinary"
course of his Providence, it seems that he affects
nothing, in short that he is at rest." (D 252,3)
Now,

for both Malebranche and Arnauld, there is something

odd about this last statement.

Both believed that God's

activity takes place outside time.

Time is merely an

ordering concept with application to creation.
that God is now at rest,

just like Leibniz’

The idea

idea that God

pre-established a harmony among substances, is

a helpful

device for getting to understand a rather more complicated
thesis.

But surely the idea in each case is that God has

just those volitions sufficient for the initial state of
the universe along with its laws.

are necessary.

In fact,

No additional volitions

at the very point where

Malebranche presents his argument based on the equivalence
of creation and conservation (which was supposed to lend

most credence to the traditional interpretation) he makes

almost exactly this point.

He says "the conservation of

creatures is on the part of God simply a continued
creation,

simply the same volition which subsists and

operates unceasingly" (D 156,7).

The point is not that

creation and conservation are the same kind of action for
God,

but that they are the very same action.
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It seems that Mai ebranche s conception of
the
'

contents of God's volitions is something like this.

There

are particular volitions, with particular times associated

with them.

God wills,

for example,

that at the first

instant of creation Adam should be a ful 1~ grown man, or

that at time t the water turns into wine.
is different from saying

turns into wine".

"God wills at t that the water

On the other hand there are general

volitions which have no associated time.
these are the general laws.

happens at a time.
of God's will

Note that this

The contents of

No volition of God's itself

They are all eternal, and the content

is unchanging.

The effects of the

particular volitions will occur at the relevant times but
that is not to say that that is when the volitions occur.
The effects of the general volitions will be spread out

over time.
state

s

Of course,

no volition of the form "if

and is in relation R to

have any particular consequence.

c'

then

c'

is

c

is

in

in s'" will

Surely, when Malebranche

talks of the effects of God's general volitions, this is

elliptical for the effects of the combination of God's
general volitions and those particular volitions

concerning 'the initial state of creation.

The entire

contents of his unchanging will, all of his volitions

taken together, are a sufficient condition for everything
that happens at all times in the world.
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At the end of part

2

of this section,

that Arnauld's objection to Mai ebranche

action is a double edged sword.

'

s

I

suggested

account of God's

If God only acts by

general volitions, then he has no providential care for

particular individuals, but if he acts by particular
volitions, then he has a particular volition for each evil
state of affairs, and it is hard to see how he can avoid

culpability.

Arnauld believed that there was promise of

escape from the latter difficulty, but that the former was

nothing but an egregious error with no redeeming features.
If

I

am right about the correct interpretation of

Mai ebranche

'

account, then he seems, on the face of it,

s

still subject to the former problem.

This objection

rested on the following premise: if God chooses state of
affairs

s

then he has a particular volition for

contrapos it ive ly

volition for

s

,

s;

if God fails to have a particular

then he has not chosen

It seems that Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

s.

best hope for

circumventing this problem is to drive a wedge between
God's choosing a state of affairs
s

obtain.

Can he do this?

I

s

and God's willing that

think he can.

In article

XII of the Treatise he says:

The wisdom of God uncovers to him an infinity of
different works, and all the possible ways of executing
his designs... Just as his wisdom is his own
intelligence, so his power is no different from his
(OC V 27)
will.
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One reasonable way to interpret this is the following.

God's preference is a matter of his intellect,

independent

of his will.

he may make

a

In evaluating states of affairs,

judgement such as this:

"s-^

other things being equal."

would be preferable to

s

2

,

We may take this as a schema

for representing all of God's preferences in considering

possible designs for the world.

The "other things" will

be other states of affairs with which

s

^

or

s

2

may be

combined to produce an entire plan or dessein for the
world.

No such preference is an efficacious volition.

For one thing, other things are rarely equal.
the choice between

s-^

and

s

2

,

That is,

may well carry with it the

requirement that other choices need to be made.

The most

preferable overall design will be the one that maximizes

preferability of particular states of affairs within

it.

God will have intellectual preferences not just for

simple states of affairs, but for complex ones as well.
Take the complex state of affairs of the existence of such
and such a world

w-^.

Now consider the claim that God

prefers w^ to any other world.

On the schema for

representing God's preferences suggested above, we can
represent this preference as follows:

"For any world w R

such that w n is not identical with w 1( w x would be
preferable to w n other things being equal." But in the
There are
case of worlds, other things always are equal.
,

no additional states of affairs that the choice of w x
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would bear with it that might require to be taken into
consideration.

A world is a fully determinate set of

states of affairs.

This is my contention.

The

preference of one world over any other is no more an
efficacious volition than any other preference.

It is a

purely intellectual act for God, a judgement about a

property had by

a

certain possible world.

This is obvious

if we consider that God was under no obligation to create

any world at all.

This is because God is absolutely free

with respect to creation.

Even so, absent such an

obligation, he still may (perhaps must) form a preference.
If God's preference of the world he chose to create
is not

identical with his willing to create it, then we

may save his Providence by saying that he chooses to
create that world which, having considered all its states,
he prefers to all

others, while still claiming that the

content of his volition is merely the initial state of

creation and the laws of nature.

He does not need an

efficacious particular volition for each state of each
individual in order to be said to have a care for each
individual
B
I

.

The Activity

o_f

Created Substances

will conclude this chapter by giving brief

consideration to a different type of objection raised by
Arnauld in Book

I

of the Reflexions

.

In Chapter

I,

article iii, he tells us with respect to occasional causes
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that,

according to Malebranche,

"it would not be God who

determined these causes to place the condition following
which the effect would be produced; but it would be these
causes that determined the volition of God to such and
such an effect"

(OA XXXIX 176).

Arnauld is concerned

about the third component of occasionalism.

It is natural

to see that as a qualifying clause to the second, the

negative thesis of occasionalism.

Although there is no

real creaturely causation, there appears to be,
C explains that appearance.

and Thesis

Arnauld appears to be worried

that Malebranche is bringing in creaturely causation

through the back door.
The idea that the efficacy of God's volitions should
be subject to the dispositions of creatures has obviously

suspect theological associations.

Malebranche asserts

that Arnauld has simply misunderstood what is involved in
his doctrine.

In this section,

or not there is,

I

want to consider whether

as some have claimed, 11 a relatively

harmless way of construing Ma 1 ebranche

'

s

Thesis C so as to

prevent it from being subject to the charge of admitting
real creaturely causation.

Arnauld'

s

objection is very straightforward.

Malebranche has said that God's volitions in the ordinary
course of nature are all of them general.

In order to

have a particular effect they must be "determined" to that

effect by occasional causes.
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For example,

suppose that

part of the world that God prefers includes the state of

affairs of created substance c's being F at time
on Mai ebranche

affairs?

'

s

view,

What,

t.

is the cause of that state of

God has a general volition which implies the

following:

for any two substances x and y and time

if

t-^,

x is G at t x and x bears relation R to y then there is a
time t 2 such that t 2 is not prior to t and y is F at t
x
2

.

Obviously, this general volition, with its conditional

cannot itself have the particular effect that

form,
F at t.

c

is

Arnauld believes that Malebranche is committed to

the view that the true cause of c's being F at t is a

combination of the general volition of God and the state
of affairs of some other substance c''s being G at a time
t'

prior to t and bearing R to

c

.

Without the latter, the

former has no effect.

Arnauld took this to mean that occasional causes as

Malebranche explains them must be genuinely efficacious.
Malebranche has said that the concept of a cause

is

of

that between which and its effect there exists a necessary
connection.

I

want to pass by the question of what kind

of necessity is involved here.

elsewhere that Mai ebranche

1

s

It has been contended

notion of causal necessity is

of straight metaphysical necessity.

I

don't see the

evidence for this, but as a matter of fact Arnauld

's

objection has the same standing whether the necessity
metaphysical or some weaker notion.
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is

Malebranche believes

that x is the real cause of y if and only if x is a

sufficient condition for y

(a

causally sufficient

condition, whatever that may amount to).
Now, the primary notion of a cause,

Ma 1 ebranche and Arnauld is,

for both

of an agent.

The candidate

suggested above is a complex state of affairs.

How can we

reduce the claim that this complex state of affairs is the
cause of c’s being F at

t,

to a claim about agent

causation, about which agent or agents is or are the

cause?

Suppose that every state of affairs

s

that

constitutes a causally sufficient condition for some other
state of affairs

s'

may be construed as the state of

affairs of a certain subtance's having
or properties,

or else of several substances having

certain properties.

We can say that a substance

real causal agent in bringing about

there is a state of affairs

s

s'

such that

affairs of c's having properties
and either

certain property

a

c

is a

if and only if
s

is the state of

through F n

,

s

obtains

is a causally sufficient condition for s'

s

else there is a set of states of affairs A such that
a

member of

A,

s

or
is

each member of A obtains, the members of A

are together causally sufficient for s', and for any

member s’’ of

A,

the members of A without

s

'

together a causally sufficient condition for
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1

are not
s’

to obtain.

Now,

in our example,

c's being F at t was caused by a

combination of God’s having a certain general volition and
of c''s being G at t' and bearing R to c.

clear that

c'

It should be

satisfies the conditions presented above for

being a real causal agent in c's being F at

t.

There is a

state of affairs which is the state of affairs of c''s

having certain properties (those of being

G at t‘

and

bearing relation R to c), this state of affairs obtains
and there is a set which has for its members this state of

affairs and one other (God’s having the general volition

described above) and these two states of affairs are

together causally sufficient for c's being F at

t,

while

neither alone is.

Construed this way, Arnauld's objection strikes me,
at least,

as very persuasive.

Since he is committed to

the view that a causal power is to be explicated purely in

terms of necessary connection, Malebranche has to reject
the reduction of state-of-af fairs causality to agent

causality limned above, and substitute something else in
its place.

Needless to say, he never does this, so it is

hardly worth speculating on what he would or would not say
in this matter.

The account suggested certainly seems

plausible to me.
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CHAPTER V

OCCASIONALISM IN LEIBNIZ' CORRESPONDENCE WITH ARNAULD
In the paper "First Truths",

1

Leibniz writes the

foil owing

The diversity of the body and soul once having been
supposed, their union can be explained., without the
common hypothesis of an influence, which cannot be
understood, and without the hypothesis of occasional
causes, which appeals to a God ex machina
For God has
thus established the soul along with the body from the
beginning with so much wisdom and artifice, that from
thie original constitution and notion of each,
everything which happens in one through itself
corresponds perfectly to that which happens in the
other, just as if something had passed over from the one
into the other, which I call the hypothesis of
concomitance. (C 521; L 269)
.

For Leibniz, as for other seventeenth century philosphers,
an adequate account of the metaphysics of causation must

explain the appearance of mind-body interaction.

It is

evident from this passage, as from many subsequent,

2

that

Leibniz thought that there were three principal contenders
for such an account: the "hypothesis of an influx", that
of "occasional causes" and,

the account championed by

Leibniz himself, the "hypothesis of concomitance".
this chapter,

I

In

will consider Leibniz' main objections to

occasional ism
In "First Truths",

occasionalism is held to be

inferior to Leibniz' position on the grounds that it

appeals to a continual miraculous intervention,
machina"

"a God ex

in order to explain mind-body interactions.
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The

s

objection is neither pursued nor argued for.

However,

when Leibniz raises the same objection in his

correspondence with Antoine Arnauld
former

3
,

Arnauld resists the

characterization of occasionalism, suggesting

s

that the theory is,

in fact,

indistinguishable from

Leibniz' own "hypothesis of concomitance.".

Leibniz is

subsequently forced to defend the 'continual miracle'
objection, and in so doing, extends the objection beyond

mind-body interactions to claim that all apparent
interactions between substances of any kind are cases of

miraculous divine activity.
In part A,
of the

I

shall examine Leibniz'

first formulation

'continual miracle' argument against occasionalism

in the correspondence with Arnauld.

Arnauld suggests that

this argument rests on a misinterpretation.
that,

at least with respect to Mai ebranche

occasionalism, Arnauld is right.

I

I

suggest

'

will then show that,

once this misinterpretation has been cleared up, Leibniz'

first formulation of the argument cannot establish more

than a factual difference between the two theories.
part

B,

I

shall direct my attention to what

I

In

regard as

Leibniz' most serious consideration of the 'continual

miracle’ objection, and

I

shall present a version of the

theory of concomitance based on Leibniz' rejection of one
of the central components of occasionalism.

In part C,

shall move beyond the correspondence with Arnauld to
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I

s

.

consider briefly another objection to occasionalism from
a
later period.
First of all, a reminder of what Ma 1 ebranche

version of occasionalism amounts to. 4

it

'

contained in

is

these three theses:
A:

For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then God is a real causal agent in
c's being in s at t.

B:

For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then there is no created substance c'
such that c' is a real causal agent in c's being in s
at t
For every pair of created substances c and c', state
s and time t, c’ is an occasional causal agent in c's
being in s at t if and only if
(a) c is in s at t, and
(b) there is a state s' and a relation R and a
time t' such that
(i) t is not prior to t'
(ii) s' is a state of c' at t'
(iii) c’ stands in R to c
(iv) there is a natural law that implies
that if c' is in s' at t and stands
in R to c, then c is in s at t.
'

The language of the three theses serves very well in the

consideration of what was and what was not common ground
between occasionalism and the theory of concomitance.

I

think it is fair to say that Leibniz accepted in outline
the Cartesian (and Malebranchian) substance/mode ontology

(although this claim has to be tempered by the observation
that Leibniz recognized the existence of substantial
forms).

5

The language of agent causation appears

throughout the relevant parts of the correspondence, with
125

substances being the relevant category for causal agents
and states of substances being the relevant category
for

effects.

I

take states of substances to be composed of

modes of those substances.

6

So much for the language,

themselves?

what about the theses

Leibniz accepted A.

fairly weak claim.

7

But note that A is a

It does not discount the possibility

of creaturely co-operation.

In fact,

something akin to A

was common currency among Christian philosophers of this

period.

Descartes certainly held something like

did Arnauld.

it,

as

C.

In

8

Leibniz was also not poorly disposed towards
the letter to Arnauld of April 30,

1687,

he writes this:

do not at all disapprove when one calls minds the
occasional causes, and even in a certain way real
causes, of the movements of bodies; for, with respect to
the divine resolves, whatever God has foreseen and preordained with respect to minds, has been an occasion for
his first regulating bodies in such a way that they
would agree among themselves, following the laws and
forces that he has given them. (LA 95; RL 68)
I

Some explanation is clearly in order here.

Put simply,

there are two substances involved - my mind and my body.
Each state of my mind is a natural consequence of its

antecedent state,

i.e.

it follows according to the laws of

the mind, and each state of my body is a natural

consequence of its antecedent state, following according
to the laws of bodies.

God has brought it about that each
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state of my mind will

state of my body,

"agree" with the contemporaneous

so that,

at the moment

I

will that my

arm be raised, my body will be so disposed (as a result of
its own prior states and in accordance with the laws of

bodies) that, external conditions permitting, my arm will
be raised.

One could regard as a kind of derivative law of

nature, any generalization of this kind relating states of

minds to states of bodies or vice-versa.

Such a

derivative law would play the appropriate role in conjunct
(iv)

of condition (b)

in thesis C,

Leibnizian version of that thesis.
for Leibniz,

engendering a
Note,

though, that,

the primary notion of a natural

law is of a

general rule relating different states of one substance
In this sense,
is not a real

what

I

9
.

have called a derivative natural law

law of nature.

This will be discussed in

part B
The language of mind-body interaction should not

obscure the fact that it is true,

for Leibniz,

of all

substances, that they correspond to one another in such a

way that it is often appropriate,

for example in physics,

10
to speak as if one were causally influencing another
.

Hence we can form derivative natural laws concerning

relationships between states of substances of all kinds.
Leibniz wants to say that "to speak in metaphysical
rigour", there is no real intersubstant ial causal
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s

influence. 11

’

Corresponding to the distinction between

primary and derivative natural laws,

it makes sense,

then,

to distinguish between primary and derivative Leibnizian

occasional causation, this distinction depending on the

kind of law playing the relevant role in Ma 1 ebranche

’

Thesis C.

Leibniz parts company with Malebranche at Thesis
as his second argument will demonstrate.

B,

What will be

surprising is how little adjustment in the wording

is

required to make a big theoretical difference.
A.

The First Formulation of the
Argument
In his

1

Continual Miracle

longer letter dated July 4th/14th 1686

(Leibniz sent two to Arnauld with this dating), Leibniz
says this:

The hypothesis of occasional causes is not satisfactory
to a philosopher, it seems to me.
For it introduces a
sort of continual miracle, as though God at every moment
was changing the laws of bodies on the occasion of
thoughts of minds, or was changing the regular course of
the thoughts of the soul by exciting in it other
thoughts on the occasion of the movements of bodies; and
in general as though God were to intervene otherwise, in
ordinary matters, than in conserving each substance in
There is
its course and in the laws established for it.
thus only the hypothesis of concomitance or the
agreement of substances among themselves which explains
all this in a manner wholly conceivable and worthy of
God... God created the soul from the start in such a way
that ordinarily it has no need of these changes. (LA 65;
RL 45)
As we are about to see,

Arnauld took the main thrust

of the objection to be that it is unworthy of God that he
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should have to be constantly employed in the conduct of
the world.

According' to Leibniz' view,

God's original

creative act was sufficient to endow each substance with
all the properties necessary for its natural career.

The

causal agency of God referred to in thesis A is hardly an

agency at all on this view, but rather a merely passive
concourse (whatever that may amount to).

A similar

argument appears in a number of places, but perhaps is
most explicit in his Clarification in answer to objections
*1

raised by Pierre Bayle.

O

*

Reviewing alternative

explanations of mind-body interaction, Leibniz rejects the
occasional ist account as being "somewhat as if a man were

charged with constantly synchronizing two bad clocks which
are in themselves incapable of according with eachother"
(G IV 520;

L 494).

Leibniz claims that his own view is

"just as possible as the system of a supervisor, and more

worthy of the author of these substances" - more worthy,
presumably, because an artifact that requires constant

supervision is a bad artifact.
Arnauld's reply appeals to an example in which he
considers what account can be given of the raising of his
arm when he wills that it be raised.
of Leibniz'

Rehearsing the terms

explanation, he concludes:

It seems to me that this is saying the same thing in

other terms as those who claim that my will is the
occasional cause of the movement of my arm and that God
is the real cause of it; for they do not claim that God
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does this in time through a new act of will which he
exercises each time I wish to raise my arm, but by that
single act of the eternal will whereby he has chosen to
do everything that he has foreseen that it will be
necessary to do, in order that the universe micrht be
what he has deemed it ought to be. (LA 84 Mason
translation)
,

On Arnauld

'

the world,

s

reading of Malebranche, God forms

and,

by a single volition,

its entirety (i.e.

one fell swoop.

all

a

plan for

creates the world in

its successive temporal

states) in

It is evident that such a conception

would do away with the objection that occasionalism

requires a constant and undignified tinkering on God's
part.

But the main thrust of Leibniz' argument,

seems to me,

so it

is not against occasionalism's supposed

requirement that the divine agency central to thesis A
involve a constant and active intervention.

Indeed,

discussion in the Clarification quoted above

is

the

prefaced

by the supposition (for the sake of argument) that the

occasional ist account of divine activity does not

necessarily entail that it is entirely

miraculous.

Rather his main objection is that, if occasionalism were
true, then every instance of apparent mind-body

interaction would involve a miracle on God's part.
is because,

on the occasional i st scheme,

example) my willing that

I

it is

This

(for

raise my arm which provides the

occasion for God's raising my arm.

Now,

we are all agreed that there is a natural

Leibniz will say,
law of bodily

movements according to which the total amount of motive
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force in the universe is maintained. 13

motive force only when another loses
amount.

a

One body can gain

proportional

The occasionalist account introduces a new

movement (that in my arm) without a proportional loss
anywhere else.
i

.

e

.

a

That is contrary to the laws of nature,

mirac 1 e

As in the case of continuous particular involvement,

excessive use of miracles is deemed unworthy of God.

As a

matter of principle, Malebranche shared Leibniz' view that
there should be very few miracles among God's acts.

Each

regarded God's simplicity as one of his most important
attributes, and this includes simplicity of action.
the Treatise on Nature and Grace

,

In

Malebranche writes "God

must not do by many complicated ways what he could achieve
by a few simple acts"

(OC V 28).

Compare this with

Leibniz in the Discourse on Metaphysics (art. V):
"Whatever is said concerning the simplicity of God's ways
has its own place with respect to his means... Reason

demands that one avoid multiplicity in hypotheses or

principles much as the simplest system
astronomy"

is

preferred in

(DM 31-32).

It is clear that Arnauld's response does not address

this problem.

However, as we have seen from Chapter IV,

Arnauld recognizes that when Malebranche says that God
acts always by general volition, this means not only that
his conduct of the world involves a very small number of
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volitions (perhaps only one) with a general content, but
also that the effects of his volitions are related to one

another by natural laws, which laws are somehow to be
identified with God's volitions.

That is to say, God

wills that events in the ordinary course of nature will

succeed according to natural laws.
My contention,

in that chapter,

is that Arnauld's

interpretation is accurate, according to which God, by a
few simple and general acts of will establishes the

original state of the universe along with the natural
laws,

and by these volitions alone produces the universe

in its entirety.

The next question is, does this inter-

pretation render Mai ebranche

'

s

occasionalism immune to

Leibniz' objection?
In important respects,

Mai ebranche

'

striking resemblance to that of Leibniz.

s

theory bears

Malebranche has

his God choose from among an infinity of possible worlds.
The chosen world is instituted by the creation of its

initial state and the laws according to which subsequent

states will come about.

believes that,

Bearing in mind that Malebranche

in relating mental

events with physical

events, God acts "in consequence of the general

laws of

union of the two substances which make up man" (D 132,3;
OC XII 136), and bearing in mind Leibniz' apparent

endorsement of mind-body derivative laws, how
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is

it that

Leibniz believes he is any better off than Malebranche

with respect to miracles.
Leibniz' objection recurs in many subsequent

writings, among the best expositions appearing in the

Considerations on Principles of Life and on Plastic
Natures 14
.

It will

be valuable to rehearse the steps as

they are laid out there.
Descartes, having well recognized that there is a law of
nature which holds that the same quantity of force is
conserved (even though he was mistaken in its
application by confusing quantity of force with quantity
of motion),
thought it was unnecessary to accord the
soul the power of increasing or diminishing the force of
the body, but only that of changing its direction by
changing the course of the animal spirits. And those
among the Cartesians who have made fashionable the
doctrine of occasional causes, believed that, the soul
being unable to have any influence at all on the body,
it is necessary for God to change the course and
direction of the animal spirits following the wishes of
the soul. (G VI 540; L 587)
The Cartesians recognize a certain law of motion,

i.e.

that the total quantity of motive force in the universe is

maintained.

If this

law is to be universal

in its

application, then when a body is moved in consequence of
some volition, the movement of that body must not add to

the total sum of motive force.

Now,

Descartes and his

followers made the mistake (in Leibniz' view) of thinking
that motive force is the same thing as a measure they

called "quantity of motion”.

The quantity of motion of a

given object is determined by multiplying its mass by its
speed.

The mass is the quantity of matter, which for the
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orthodox Cartesian is simply
Hence,

a

matter of its extension.

Descartes thought he could save the law while

maintaining a doctrine of mind-body interaction by saying
that a volition could result in a change in the direction
of a body,

but not in its quantity of motion.

occasional ists
God,

,

The

eschewing efficacy in the mind, said that

on the occasion of a certain volition, would change

the direction of the relevant body but not change its

quantity of motion. 15
"But" said Leibniz "if they had known at the time of

Descartes the new law of nature that

I

have demonstrated,

which holds that not only the same quantity of total force
of bodies that interact with eachother,

but also their

total direction is conserved, he would evidently have come
to my system of pre-established harmony"
587).

(G VI

540; L

The demonstration referred to is the paper entitled

"A brief demonstration of a notable error...",

published

shortly before the letters we have been considering. 16

Leibniz claimed to demonstrate that the measure of motive
force adopted by the Cartesians was wrong, that it should
be not mass times speed but the product of mass and the

square of velocity.

Most importantly for this argument,

he took it to follow from this that the "total direction"
is conserved.

17

According to this revised law, the mind

cannot introduce a new direction any more than it can
introduce a new motion.

Hence,
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either the mind does not

act on the body or the principal

law of motion is

"deranged" every time it does.
The important point to note here is that what holds
for Descartes is supposed to hold as well for the

occasional ist

.

The occasional ist holds,

the mind does not act on the body.

of course that

But he also holds that

a new motion is introduced into the body by God on the

occasion of a certain volition in the mind.

Leibniz

claims that neither new motive force nor new direction can
be introduced into bodies,

from any source, without

thereby deranging the laws of nature.
occasional causes, God...

is

"In the system of

obliged to change at every

moment the natural train of thoughts of the soul in order
to accomodate them to the impressions of bodies, and to

disturb the natural course of the movements of bodies

according to the volitions of the soul, something which
can only be explained by a perpetual miracle"
587)

(G VI

541;

L

.

On the Cartesian scheme, there is a tension between
the laws governing the movements of bodies and the

generalizations that Malebranche calls the laws of union
of body and mind.

Leibniz denies that the latter could be

genuine even derivative natural laws if Cartesian physics
were true,
of nature.

since they would conflict with the primary laws
Thus,

for example,

he sees the movement of my

arm produced on the occasion of my willing to move my arm
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as being miraculous,

unless that movement is also in

accordance with the ordinary laws of physics, given the
prior state of my arm.
of thesis C,

Looking at the Leibnizian versions

we can say this: an instance of derivative

occasional causation having for its effect my arm's being

raised at a given time, can occur only if there occurs
also an instance of primary occasional causation having
the same effect at the same time.

Since Cartesian physics

precludes the latter in the event of mind-body occasional
interactions,

such interactions must always be accompanied

by miraculous interventions.
It seems at this stage that there are three ways in

which Malebranche might respond.

First,

that all such movements are miraculous.

he could admit
I

don't believe

any major proponent of occasionalism would have embraced
this position willingly.
Second, he could reject the privileged status of

Leibnizian primary laws, substituting instead a heirarchy
of his three kinds of natural

law,

in which those

governing the relationship of mind and body may sometimes
override the laws relating states of particular

substances 18
.

Whether or not Malebranche would have been

happy with this conception of matters is something
go into here,

because

I

I

won't

think that the occasional ist has a

more telling response to make.
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Leibniz wants to rest his argument for an important
conceptual difference between his own theory of causation
and occasionalism on a factual claim about the laws of
nature.

An occasional ist can clearly accept the claim

about the laws of nature.

Must he therefore abandon the

conceptual framework of occasionalism.
He could argue as follows: God,

The answer is no.

seeing that the laws of

motion that he has chosen may come into conflict with the
laws of union of mind and body that he has chosen, will

decide to institute the first state of the world in such
way that no occasion for such a conflict arises.

a

He

brings it about that whenever my mind wills to raise my
arm my body will be in a suitable state to occasion the

raising of my arm in accordance with the laws of motion
(so

long as no other impediment obstructs in accordance

with the same laws).

According to this account, the

psycho-physical laws would be redundant.

This might come

as a surprise or even a disappointment to an orthodox

Cartesian, but would not be grounds for abandoning the

metaphysics of the theory of causation.

In fact,

the view

limned above seems indistinguishable from that of Leibniz,
and yet it departs from standard accounts of occasionalism

only in factual detail regarding what genuine laws there
are.

Perhaps most importantly, Leibniz has not brought

grounds for rejecting any of the three theses.

addition to article xvii of the Treatise
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,

In the

Malebranche

claims

"that.

it.

would need a whole separate book to show

which laws of nature really hold. "But that" he says "is
not essential to my subject.

It is sufficient that the

laws of nature should be general"

(OC V 31).

What laws of

nature there are is not an essential part of the theory;
only that there are general

laws of nature that God

follows in his conduct of the world.

Bjl

The S econd Fo rm ulation of the
Argument
In his

Continual Miracle

'

letter of April 30th 1687, Leibniz develops a

new line of argument.
letter,

'

he asserts "if

Quoting from Arnauld's March 4th
I

properly understand the opinion

of the authors of occasional

causes, they introduce a

miracle which is no less so for being continual, for it
seems to me that the concept of a miracle does not consist
in infrequency"

(LA 92;

RL 64).

The occasional i st position has been defended by

Arnauld from the charge of introducing continual miracles
into God's actions by the observation that God acts

invariably according to a general plan and in keeping with

certain regularities that occasional ists claim are laws of
nature.

Leibniz claims that God "could make for himself

general rules even with respect to miracles" (LA 93; RL
65).

The fact that the actions of God exhibit regularity,

frequency and generality is insufficient to prevent their
being miraculous.

There is some feature other than

138

:

,

regularity intrinsic to natural events that distinguishes
them from the miraculous.

This is how Leibniz explains

that feature in the correspondence:
A miracle differs intrinsically and in the substance of
the act from an ordinary action, and not by an external
accident of frequent repetition.
Strictly speaking, God
performs a miracle when he does anything which surpasses
the powers which he has given to creatures and which he
conserves in them...
We would have to say, in
accordance with the current conception, that if the
continuation of motion surpasses the power of bodies,
the continuation of motion is a true miracle; instead of
which I believe that corporeal substance has the power
to continue its changes following with the laws which
God has put into its nature and conserves there. (LA 93;
RL 65)

Leibniz is not being entirely forthcoming here.

A full

understanding of what is meant by "the laws which God has
put into its nature and conserves there" would require,
for Arnauld, at least having read several full articles of

the Discourse on Metaphysics

abstract of that work.

1

9

.

Arnauld had only read an

In the Discourse article xvi

Leibniz outlined two distinct concepts of the nature of
substance 20

a

He says

If we comprehend in our nature everything that it
expresses, nothing is supernatural to it, because it
extends to everything... But as that which our nature
expresses most perfectly pertains in a particular way to
it, since it is in this that its power consists... there
are indeed things that surpass the powers of our nature,
and even those of all limited natures. (DM 53)

In the first sense,

the nature of a substance is co-

extensive with its complete individual concept, the
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complete set of intrinsic properties had by that
substance.

Leibniz says that each substance "expresses",

with varying degrees of distinctness,

everything that

happens to it throughout its career.

One state of a

substance follows from its antecedent state in accordance
with what Leibniz calls "the universal law of general
order"

(DM 52;

cf.

DM 32-33).

This is the general rule

that God follows in his conduct of the world.

However,

consequent on this "universal law" are certain
"subordinate maxims", the laws of nature.

The mark of a

law of nature is that it can be understood by a finite

mind,

and what can be understood by a finite mind is what

it expresses most clearly.

In the second sense,

the

nature of a substance consists only in those states most

distinctly expressed by it.
For Leibniz, the primary laws of nature are those

that relate the successive states of one individual
So one state of a substance follows from its

substance.

antecedent state,

in the ordinary course of nature,

if it

follows in accordance with the subordinate maxim or law
that governs the natural actions' of that substance.

A

miracle is any event that occurs which is not governed by
any of these laws.
Now,

I

don't think that, as yet, there is anything

here that is damaging to occasionalism.

An occasional ist

could accept the whole business of universal and
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subordinate laws, and of greater and lesser degrees of

expression without denying that God

ultimately the only

is

cause of any state of any created substance.

Leibniz'

assertion that "that which our nature expresses most
perfectly pertains to it in a particular way, since it

is

in this that its power consists" has an echo in this maxim

from New Essays on Human Understanding

:

"the power of

conceiving is the measure of nature's powers." 21

An

occasional ist may say "if this is what is meant by
'natural powers' then we don't deny that creatures have

such powers.

But these are not real causal powers."

However, Leibniz clearly holds that underlying the

'distinct expression' account of nature is some notion of
real power intrinsic in created substances.

The

difference between natural and supernatural events
just phenomenal.

is not

Leibniz' main argument for real active

powers in created entities is that without them there
could be no substantial unity - no individual substances.
This is how he argues for this conclusion in the draft for
the letter to Arnauld of November 28/December

8

1686:

It will be conceded that two bodies set apart from one

another, for example two triangles, are not really one
Let us now assume that they are brought
substance.
together to make up a square. Will the mere fact of
their contiguity turn them into one substance? I do not
Now, each extended mass can be conceived as
think so.
consisting of two or a thousand others; there exists
Thus one
only an extension achieved through contiguity.
truly
may
will never be able to find a body of which it
(LA 72)
be said that it is truly one substance.
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.

If all

there were in bodies was extension, there would be

individual corporeal substances.

So,

it follows,

we

must attribute an additional component, an "active

principle

or substantial

form,

to explain the substantial

unity of any given corporeal substance.
I

is

hope it goes without saying that what we have here

an outright rejection of Mai ebranche

It is central

'

s

second thesis.

to the occasional ist position that a created

individual can have no power to change the states either
of itself or of any other thing.

If the Leibnizian

conditions for miracles are correct, then of course

occasionalism implies that everything that happens

is

miracul ous

Needless to say, Malebranche could (and will) deny
this definition of the miraculous.
point.

But that is not the

In championing intrinsic powers in natural beings,

Leibniz is self-consciously distancing himself from some
of the consequences of occasional ist metaphysics.

What

those consequences are will emerge in the final part of my
paper.

In the meantime

I

want to see how this departure

affects Leibniz' position with regard to the three theses
of occasionalism.
It turns out that Leibniz accepts Thesis B with only

one (seemingly innocuous) rider: Thesis B is true where
is not

identical with

c.

So individual

c'

substances are not

excluded from being causal agents in bringing about their
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own states.

For example, when Arnauld asks what causes

the pain on the occasion of his being pricked, Leibniz

answers "that the soul forms for itself this pain, which
is a natural

consequence of its state or concept" (LA 74;

RL 53).
This makes some difference to Thesis C.

distinction

I

Consider the

made between primary occasional causation

and derivative occasional causation.

This distinction is

based on a distinction between primary natural laws and

derivative natural laws.

Since primary natural laws

-

laws that relate states of one individual substance - can

now be seen to be genuine causal laws, we can see that

primary occasional causation is real causation.
like Malebranche,

Leibniz,

needs to explain the appearance of

causal relationships among created substances.
the purpose that Thesis C serves.

That is

The appearance-saving

component in Leibniz' theory need only make reference to
what

I

have called derivative occasional causation.

The change in Thesis B has a rather more profound

effect on the implications of Thesis
of Thesis A,

Mai ebranche

'

s

A.

The conjunction

Thesis B and the principle that

only substances can be real causal agents implies that God
is the only real

causal agent.

God's causal agency in

each state of each substance is total.

The conjunction of

the Leibnizian version of Thesis B with Thesis A and the

proposition that created substances are real causes of
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)

their own states in practically all instances

has the

consequence that there are cases (a great number) of
dual
causal agency between God and created substances.

Leibni z

wants to say that for the most part, God concurs in the

actions of individual substances.

In Chapter VI we must

consider whether that is a tenable position for Leibniz.
C

.

The

'

Subs i stent Effect

1

Objection

In his 1694 paper "On Nature Itself", Leibniz

introduces a new and somewhat surprising objection to

occasionalism.

because

I

I

want to consider this objection here

think it throws light on the precise point at

which Malebranche and Leibniz are unable to agree.

Writing on the occasionalism of the physicist Johann

Christophe Sturm, he says:
He admits that motions now taking place result by virtue
of an eternal law once established by God, which he then
calls a volition or command, and that no new command or
new volition of God is then necessary... But this
explanation does not seem to me to do justice to the
truth.
For I ask whether this volition or command has
bestowed upon things only an extrinsic denomination or
whether it has truly conferred upon them some created
impression which endures within them or... an internal
The
law from which their actions and passions follow..
former view seems to be that of the authors of the
system of occasional causes and especially of the
ingenious M. Malebranche; the latter is the accepted
For since this command
view, and I believe the truest.
in the past no longer exists at present, it can
accomplish nothing unless it has left some subsistent
effect behind it. (G IV 506; L, p500. Translation by

Loemker
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:

Whatever Leibniz may mean by "...has bestowed upon
things only an extrinsic denomination...",

message is clear.

think the

i

A cause cannot act remote in space and

time from its effect.

God's volitons at the time of

creation cannot be acting on us now except through some
medium, the medium of the natures of substances.
Mai ebranche would surely have shuddered at reading this.

What Leibniz is saying here is tantamount to the denial

that God's actions take place outside of time.

Malebranche,

it is fundamental that they do.

For
This is from

Dialogue VI I
From all eternity God has willed, and to all eternity he
will continue to will - or to speak more accurately, God
wills unceasingly though without variation, without
succession, without necessity - everything he will do in
the course of time (D 156,7; OC XII 159).
As soon Leibniz says "since this command no longer exists

at present",

he has parted company with Malebranche.

seems that Mai ebranche

'

s

It

conception of the contents of

God's volitions is something like this.

There are

particular volitions, with particular times associated
with them.

God wills,

for example,

that at the first

instant of creation Adam should be a full-grown man, or
that at time t the water turns into wine.
is

Note that this

different from saying "God wills at t that the water

turns into wine".

On the other hand there are general

volitions which have no associated time.
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The contents of

these are the general

happens at a time.
of God’s will

is

laws.

No volition of God's itself

They are all eternal, and the content

unchanging.

The effects of the

particular volitions will occur at the relevant times but
that is not to say that that is when the volitions occur.
The effects of the general volitions will be spread out

over time.
state

s

Of course,

no volition of the form "if

and is in relation R to

c'

have any particular consequence.

then

c'

c

is

in

in s'" will

is

Surely, when Malebranche

talks of the effects of God’s general volitions,

this is

elliptical for the effects of the combination of God's
general volitions and those particular volitions

concerning the initial state of creation 23
.

It seems reasonably clear to me that this objection

of Leibniz'

rests on the most fundamental difference of

conception between himself and Malebranche.

For

Malebranche, the central component of the concept of cause
seems to be that of necessity.

Malebranche saw that God's

volitions must have their effect necessarily, and hence it
was sufficient that a state of affairs be entailed by the

content of God's volitions for that state of affairs to
come about.

it seems that there is a

For Leibniz,

residual question, which

is,

roughly, by what means or by

what force does this volition have its effect.

For

Leibniz, the concept of a force or a power is still at the

heart of the concept of a cause.
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In order for God's

volition that a certain law be observed by creatures to be
enacted,

it is necessary either that God individually

compels them to observe the law, or that he endows each

creature with the power or force to observe the law by
itself.

In the concluding chapter,

say about this divergence.
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I

will have more to

.

.
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in general,

CHAPTER VI
OCCASIONALISM, NATURE AND CONCURRENCE
The success of the

'continual miracle'

objection to

occasionalism depends on Leibniz' ability to sustain his
view that created entities exercise real power in bringing
about their own states.
expression'

Without that, his 'distinct

concept of natural powers can be reduced to a

sophisticated form of occasionalism.

We have seen

Leibniz' main argument for the view that there are

substantial forms in created substances

1

but

,

I

believe

that this argument alone will not show that these
2

substantial forms are real causal powers.
chapter,

I

In this final

shall consider two of the most important

reasons Leibniz had for holding that they are.

Naturally,

he felt that this importance lay in significant advantages

that his own theory had.
I

think it's fair to say that Leibniz saw the

advantages of his scheme as falling into two categories:

advantages for physics and advantages for theology.
In section A,

will take them in order.

I

We

shall examine

Leibniz' argument that someone who is a Cartesian about
the nature of matter is theoretically committed to the

wrong laws of physics.

In section B,

I

shall turn to

Leibniz' efforts to establish a satisfactory account of

concurrence, one that leaves room for freedom.
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I

shall

conclude by suggesting how occasionalism may be defended
in the face of the alleged advantages.

A.

The Laws of Nature

Mai ebranche is committed to the Cartesian metaphysic
of substance.

Substances come in two kinds, material and

mental, bodies and spirits.

Concentrating on the body,

the Cartesian view is that its essence is nothing but

extension and its modes are nothing but modes of
Leibniz believes that if this account of

extension.

substance were true, then natural phenomena would not be
what they are.

Metaphysics

,

In article xxi of the Discours e on

he writes:

If there were nothing in bodies but extended mass, and
motion were only a change of place, and if everything

ought to be and could be deduced by geometric necessity
from these definitions alone, it would follow... that
the smallest body would give to a larger one at rest
which it met, the same velocity, without losing any of
the velocity it had itself (DM 64).

Leibniz seems to hold that anyone who is a Cartesian
about the properties of matter is theoretically committed
to the wrong laws of nature.

Recall the argument

4 in which Leibniz
recounted in the previous chapter,

employs his discovery that the measure of force conserved
2
in nature is mv

.

He concluded from this that,

since the

conservation of this quantity includes conservation of
total motion in a given direction, nothing is able to

introduce either a wholly new and uncompensated motion or
152

a new

direction into the natural world except by deranging

the laws of nature,

i.e.

by a miracle.

Occasionalism was

defended against this argument by pointing out that God
could have created the world in such a way that no motion
of a body or action of a will

fact,

is ever,

as a matter of

the occasion for such a derangement.

God could

create and sustain the world according to the laws that

Leibniz claims are the true ones.
Effectively, what Leibniz does at DM xxi is to deny
to someone who holds the Cartesian view of matter the

option of this latter move

conservation law.

- the

"occasional izing" of the

In order to understand his argument,

will be necessary to draw a couple of distinctions.
of all,

I

distinguish here and elsewhere between

and the quantity it measures.

For example

I

a

it

First

measure

distinguish

between the quantity of motion in a body, which Descartes
seems to regard as a mode of that body, and the measure of

that quantity which is calculated by multiplying the

measure of the speed of the body and the measure of its
size.

Speed times size is not quantity of motion but is

the measure of it.

This is important because there are some measures

which do not apparently measure any real quantity at all.
I

believe that Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz would

all of them have agreed that there is a reasonable

distinction between the natural properties that a thing
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has in its own right and certain artificial ones that we

may attribute to it.

The length, volume, motion,

a body are all natural modes of that body,

of

properties that

really inhere in it (although motion is odd,
Descartes,

etc.

for

since he thinks that it is purely relational.)

Each of these real quantities has its own measure.

5

On the

other hand, we may come up with a certain measure of a
body by multiplying the square of its length by its volume
by the cube of its speed and dividing the whole lot by an

arbitrary constant.

This would be some sort of measure of

the body, but on the view of none of the above would it

measure any real quantity.
It might,

It might measure something.

perhaps, be used to determine the cash value of

each object, but this is only an artificial quantity.

There is no real mode naturally occurring in any object

which this measure represents.

Obviously there is a degree of vagueness in the
notions of real and artificial quantities.

The

geometrical quantities like length, breadth and depth are

uncontrovers ial ly among the natural ones.

6

example seems uncontrovers ia 1 1 y artificial.

The latter
The

interesting cases with respect to measures and the

quantities they measure concern the measurement of force.
Descartes seems to have thought, and Leibniz did not
challenge this, that what is measured by speed times size,
what he called quantity of motion,
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is a real

quantity

- a

.

natural mode of bodies.

But Leibniz discovered that this

quantity is not conserved.
On Leibniz' view, there is nothing in the geometrical

properties of matter which entails that his measure of
motive force, the product of mass and the square velocity
will be conserved.

(mv

),

So,

mv 2 cannot measure a real geometrical quantity.

And yet,

says Leibniz,

it is.
*7

Yet

God’s choice of the law that conserves this measure cannot
be arbitrary.

It follows that mv

must measure some real

though non-geometrical quantity that is conserved, i.e.
motive force.

"Force" he concludes "is something

different from size, shape or motion, and one may judge
from this that everything conceived in body does not

consist solely in extension and its modifications, as our

moderns persuade themselves" (DM 58).

There must be

intrinsic principles of action in bodies, which explain
why mv

is

conserved and not the quantity proposed by the

Cartesians
My suspicion is that this attempt to show that there
is an essential

conceptual

link between Cartesian

metaphysics and the abandoned conservation law must be
unsuccesful

.

Leibniz is appealing here to the Principle

of Sufficient Reason:

there must be a satisfactory

explanation for why this measure is conserved.
Ma 1 ebranche would hardly deny that,
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but he may deny that

.

the reason must be that some real quantity is being

conserved
Leibniz' reasoning here is elliptical in the extreme.
In attempting to understand it,

I

think it is worth

rehearsing Descartes' reasons for holding the conservation
law he does.

In The World he tells us "with God always

acting in the same way and producing substantially the
same effect,

there are, as if by accident, many

differences in this effect”
God is immutable,

I

93).

,

this fact is sufficient for the

establishment of the particular laws of nature.

Principles

,

Since

it is true that God always acts in the

In the World

same way.

(AT XI 37; CSM

there is an additional step.

In the

God's

immutablity gives us grounds for holding a very general
law of motion,

the law that the total amount of motion and

rest is conserved.

This law stands as a kind of

conditioning principle for the other laws of nature.
Here,

again, God's immutability is the key:

God's perfection involves not only his being immutable
in himself, but also his operating in a manner that is
God imparted
always utterly constant and immutable.
various motions to the parts of matter when he first
created them, and now he preserves all this matter in
the same way, and by the same process by which he
originally created it; and it follows from what we have
said that this fact alone makes it most reasonable to
think that God likewise always preserves the same
(AT VIIIA 61-2; CSM I
quantity of motion in matter.
.

240)
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.

.

The total quantity of motion (measured as size
times
speed)

is

maintained in the universe, and this

is the

fundamental law of physics, because God put a certain

amount of motion into the world at the creation and it
would be inconstant of him to change that.
My assumption is that Leibniz' reasoning is similar.
He,

is c omm itted to God's

too,

i

mmut ab ility.

But since

the measure of what is conserved in the universe does not

measure quantity of motion we must seek some other
quantity,
conserve.

one which is measured by mv 2

,

that God does

Leibniz recognizes that nothing in the

geometrical properties of matter remains constant, so
there must be something else among the properties of

matter that God conserves, something which explains why
the phenomena are the way they are.

The alternative is

that God's conservative action is inconstant,

in order

that a seemingly arbitrary measure may remain constant.

O

For Malebranche, all of the above concern about what
real quantities God conserves is entirely unnecessary.

As

we saw in Chapter IV, Malebranche does not conceive of

God's immutability as a kind of succession of

qualitatively identical states.
state of God,

There is one timeless

including the volition or volitions he has

which are sufficient for every temporal state of the
world.

When Descartes says that creation and conservation

are the same action for God,

157

he seems to have in mind the

s

same kind of action.

God has a succession of volitions in

creating and conserving the world, each of which has the
same content.

This is evident when we consider his

argument for the conservation law.

If the

quantity of

motion were to change, that would mean God had changed his
mind; the volition required for the most recent state of

the world would have had a different content.
If,

on the other hand, we adopt Mai ebranche

’

picture, according to which one complex and eternal

volition is sufficient for the world in its temporal
entirety, there would be no problem with no quantity being

conserved at all.

God could have willed and sustained a

world with no conservation law without threat to his
immutability.
Mai ebranche

1

s

What motivates the laws of nature on

view is not God's immutability, but rather

the perfection of simplicity or elegance of means.

Leibniz and Malebranche are more or less agreed about
the constraints on God's choice of natural

laws.

On the

one hand the laws must be simple, but on the other they

must be, to use Malebranche

'

s

term,

"fecond" or fertile. 9

There is no reason why this latter constraint should not

provide the sufficient reason for a law which, considered
in itself,

may seem arbitrary.

God could,

indeed does,

conduct the world according to this law, and he presumably
has good reason to do so,

based on considerations of

balance between simplicity and fertility.
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.

This is an admittedly hasty consideration of the

consequences for physics of Leibniz' view.

I

think there

considerable work to be done on the exact relationship

is

that Leibniz saw between metaphysics and physics 10
.

I

What

want to contend here is that, at least on the face of

it,

Malebranche can appeal to the conflicting constraints

on God's choices in order to explain any prima facie

arbitrariness in the laws of nature, and can thereby avoid
the requirement of positing natural causal powers of any

kind
B
So much,

then,

.

Divine Concurrence
for physics.

advantages for theology?

What about the supposed

The most obvious advantage that

Leibniz saw for his scheme over the occasional ist position
was that concomitance leaves room for human freedom while

occasionalism must surely be incompatible with
Related to this is a theodicean advantage.

it.

Leibniz

believes his position provides the only hope for a

solution to the problem of evil.

A full account of these

advantages would have to explain exactly what God's

concurrence in creaturely action amounts to for Leibniz.
There would be some merit in a close examination of
Leibiz'

conception of concurrence, but

here 11 in large part because
,

I

I

will not do that

think Malebranche has an

excellent argument for the conclusion that any kind of
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concurrence is impossible.

I

will conclude by

crivincr a

brief account of that argument.
In Chapter

I

,

concurrence was introduced as a

technical term in the following way:

God concurs in state

of affairs s if and only if God efficaciously wills that s

obtain and there is some other agent a such that a is a
real causal agent in s's obtaining.

We might want to call

this technical notion strong’ concurrence since the

ordinary understanding of concurrence allows for a variety
of ways in which God might team up with created agents to

produce effects.

The concept of pre-conditioning might

reasonably be regarded as a weak concept of concurrence.
God may even contribute to states of affairs without

knowing what other agents will contribute.
say,

Needless to

this last concept of concurrence would not be in

accord with the doctrine of Divine Providence.
Leibniz adhered to the doctrine of Providence.
is a real

God

causal agent in every state of every substance

and knows all the outcomes of his contributions.

There is

reason to think that his notion of concurrence is not the
strong one.

For one thing, he holds that there are

certain states of affairs that it would be inappropriate
instances of creaturely sin,

to say God caused directly,

for example. 13

Chapter III,

Ma 1 ebranche

,

however,

as was shown in

felt that both the weaker notion, according

to which God's contribution to some states of affairs is
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mere pre conditioning and the stronger notion are

incoherent
It became evident earlier on that the ways Leibniz

and Mai ebranche each view the antecedents of creation are

very similar.

In each case,

God is supposed to survey

(figuratively speaking) the infinity of possible worlds
open to him and choose that which is most worthy of

creation.

Leibniz describes this choice as the object of

God's general will. 14

This is terminology that has a

parallel in Malebranche.

According to the latter, God's

ordinary conduct of the world

is

enacted through his

general volition, the simple and general acts of will by

which the world was created and the laws instituted.
Mai ebranche

'

s

view,

In

the initial acts of choosing that

brought it about that this be the world were both

necessary and sufficient for every subsequent state.
is because,

as he he says in the Treatise

,

This

"God has no

need of instruments in order to act; his volitions are

necessarily efficacious" (art. xii, OC V 27).
is

The result

that there is no room for anything else to act,

nothing for anything to co-operate in.
Now the idea that God's volitions are necessarily

efficacious is not unique to Malebranche.
the Discourse on Metaphysics (article V):

This is from
"It is true that

nothing has any cost to God, any more than to a

philosopher in forming hypotheses in order to create his
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imaginary world.

Because God needs only to make decrees

to bring into being a real world"

(DM 32).

It would seem

that if God forms the general volition to create this
world, then he thereby and directly brings about

everything that happens in this world.

That surely

precludes the possibility of any state of affairs being

merely pre-conditioned.
In Chapter III,

we saw Mai ebranche

'

s

argument to the

effect that strong concurrence is impossible. 15

It is

roughly that, since God's efficacious will is a necessary

condition for bringing about any state of affairs, no
state of any other substance can be a sufficient condition
for any state of affairs, which is what was required in

order for a substance to be a genuine cause.
in section B of Chapter IV,

this argument.

As suggested

there may be a problem with

But Malebranche is entitled to fall back

on this question:

what explanatory role can the positing

of natural causes perform?

In God,

we already have a

cause of every state of affairs requiring a cause.

Positing any further real cause, apart from being
redundant,

implies that God is in need of instruments to

bring about his ends.
C

.

Concluding Remarks

Where does all this leave us at the end of the day

with respect to Leibniz' claimed theological advantages.

Malebranche is entitled to the view that Leibniz gets the
162

.

advantages only at the cost of two disadvantages.

First,

that God is in need of intermediate means to bring about
his ends,

and second, that God does not act from the point

of view of eternity but from within the limits of time.

These two propositions are the principle excesses of the

deist heresy that both philosophers wanted to avoid at all
costs.

Whether Leibniz can avoid that heresy is not

something

I

want to go into here.

suggest that he cannot.

However,

I

I

do not wish to

believe that without a

satisfactory answer to such an argument as has been

presented here, the advantages of the theory of
concomitance cannot be sustained.

Such an answer must,

I

believe, elucidate Leibniz' conception of the distinction

between God's general and particular will (see, e.g.
Disco u rse on Metaphysics

V,
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DM 34)

.

1.

Notes

2.

See pages 135ff..

However, it may be argued that if an entity is to serve
as a principle of unity, as Leibniz' substantial forms
do, it can only so serve by actively uniting that of
which it is the principle of unity, i.e. it must, by
definition, exercise a real causal power.
3.

The locus classicus of this position is Descartes'
Fifth Meditation (AT VII 63-5; CSM II 44-5); see also
Principles Part I, articles 53 and 54 (AT VIIIA 25; CSM
210-1).
I

4.

See pages 127ff.

5.

Similarly, for Leibniz this claim must be treated with
caution.
Leibniz says in the Discourse on Metaphysics
that "the notions contained in extension contain
something imaginary" (DM xii) and hence are not to be
regarded as real natural properties. Rather there is
something in a corporeal substance that grounds its
being perceived as extended.
Nonetheless, Leibniz
seems to have been comfortable with talking of
extension as an attribute of corporeal substances, and
besides, he certainly knows the distinction between the
primitive intrinsic properties that a thing has and
what he calls its extrinsic denominations. With respect
to the latter, there are none that are irreducibly
extrinsic, i.e. that cannot be denoted without
reference to other substances.

6.

There may be controversy about which properties are to
Leibniz seems
be regarded as the geometrical ones.
prepared to accept the quantity of motion of a body as
a geometrical property, but finds nothing among the
geometrical properties that corresponds to his measure
of motive force, mass times the square of velocity.
Nonetheless, mass can be regarded as equivalent to the
Cartesian size, which is a geometrical property, and
velocity is speed in a given direction. So the measure
of motive force is a compound of measures of
geometrical quantities, yet, on Leibniz' view it does
not itself measure a geometrical quantity.

7

See note

.

8.

6

above

What God conserves, on Leibniz' view is substances and
If there is no intrinsic
their intrinsic properties.
property of a substance that is represented by the
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,,

measure mv 2 then there is no real quantity that God
keeps constantly the same.

9.

Treatise article xvii (OC V 31).
10.

For my ideas on this matter
comments of John Carriero.

11.

For a useful introduction to Leibniz' views on
concurrence, see R. C. Sleigh Jr. "Leibniz on
Malebranche on Causality" in J. A. Cover and Mark
Kulstad, eds Centra 1 Themes in Early Modern Phi 1 osophy
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991).

I

am indebted to the

.

12

.

See

for example, Grua 312.

13

.

See

for example,

14

.

15

.

Grua 308.

See Discourse on Metaphysics article v (DM 34)
See pages 85ff.
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